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This thesis evaluates the Navy's test and evaluation
(T&E) process for aircraft weapon systems, identifies prob-
lems, and proposes a reorganization of the Navy's T&E
agencies. Many changes have been made to Improve the T&E
process, but some of these have resulted in costly ineffi-
ciencies. Contributing problems include: the Navy's
"independent" test agency being tasked more on the basis of
its apparent independence than on its testing expertise,
lack of actual independence of the many test agencies,
excessive testing duplication, inadequate testing expertise,
lack of operational test objectives, inadequate test planning,
lack of a weapon system T&E school, and numerous T&E manage-
ment problems.
The establishment of a Naval T&E Command which is organi-
zationally separate from the developing agency and the OPNAV
program sponsor is proposed. The Naval T&E Command would be
responsible for all T&E conducted by the Navy with the
exception of that done by Navy Laboratories. The Naval T&E
Command would have separate divisions responsible for
development T&E and operational T&E, and the developing
agency could task the T&E Command to perform any type of T&E.
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During the past decade all phases of the Department of
Defense (DOD) weapon system acquisition process have been
under increasing criticism. Frequent cost growth, coupled
with poor operational performance of many weapon systems
when they entered operational service, has been the main
impetus for the appointment of numerous committees and
commissions to study the weapon system acquisition process.
The President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, the Government
Accounting Office, the Congress's Commission on Government
Procurement, and the Armed Services Committees of the House
of Representatives and Senate have consistently identified
test and evaluation as a major problem area.
The current DOD major system acquisition policy pro-
hibits the "total package procurement" concept that was in
vogue in the 1960's. Concurrency between development and
production is being minimized, and a determination of opera-
tional suitability, including logistic support requirements,
is required -before a production decision is made. This
change in system acquisition philosophy has resulted in
greater emphasis in test and evaluation. Consequently,
problems existing in DOD's test and evaluation (T&E) process
will have an even greater effect on the acquisition of major
weapon systems than ever before.
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It has been less than three years since the major change
to the DOD weapon system acquisition process was implemented
by DOD Directive 5000.1, entitled "Acquisition of Major
Defense Systems" [Ref. 1]. Unfortunately, reforming the
weapon system acquisition process is an undertaking which
does not lend itself to instantaneous change. By now, most
of the implementing DOD Directives and Navy instructions
have been written, but changes in the area of test and
evaluation are still being made and others comtemplated in
order to more effectively implement the acquisition philos-
ophy that is embodied in DOD Directive 5000.1. Many problems
still exist in the Navy's T&E process, and new problems are
being created by the implementation of the new DOD acquisi-
tion philosophy.
As a result of the criticism that has been directed at
T&E, many people believe that improved and expanded test and
evaluation will be the most significant step towards elimi-
nating the cost growths and performance underruns that have
been so typical of weapon system development programs.
Problems do exist in the military's T&E process that
adversely affect the weapon system acquisition process.
However, many of the problems that exist in T&E are sympto-
matic of problems existing throughout the weapon system
acquisition environment, i.e. Congress, DOD, and industry.
In order to improve the weapon system acquisition process
attention must be devoted to the entire acquisition process
and not merely to making patchwork corrections to each
12

segment of the process [Ref. 2]. Although changes are
required to the T&E process, one should not erroneously
believe that these changes alone will have a significant effect
in solving the many problems facing the weapon system
acquisition process today.
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to:
(1) evaluate the Navy's test and evaluation process for
aircraft weapon systems,
(2) identify problems that exist in the Navy's current
implementation of test and evaluation of aircraft
weapon systems,
(3) propose a reorganization of the numerous agencies and
activities that conduct test and evaluation of Navy
aircraft weapon systems.
C. SCOPE
In the broadest sense test and evaluation (T&E) takes
place throughout a system's life cycle (Pig. 1). In the
Conceptual Phase test and evaluation takes the form of test
planning and to a limited extent, simulation, breadboard, and
laboratory testing. It isn't until the latter portions of
the Design Phase that test and evaluation takes the more
commonly thought of form of the testing of prototypes,
models, and subsystems. It is during the Design Phase and
the Production and Installation Phase that test and evalua-
tion activity reaches a peak, and it is this T&E that will
be the area of concern of this thesis. T&E does not
terminate after the Production and Installation Phase, but





























during the last two phases concentrates on determining
optimal tactics to employ the system and testing and evalu-
ating changes that are made to the system. These phases
have minimal direct impact on the acquisition process and
will not be an area of major consideration in this thesis.
Although many problems exist with the test and evaluation
of Navy aircraft, ships, and weapons, this thesis deals
solely with the Navy's test and evaluation of aircraft
weapon systems. Both the Navy and the contractor conduct
T&E on each aircraft weapon system. This thesis will address
primarily the T&E conducted by the Navy.
D. METHODS OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS
A thorough study of the available literature in the
field of the management and organization of test and evalu-
ation was conducted. This was followed by telephone inter-
views with key personnel directly involved with Naval
aircraft weapon system test and evaluation.
The Annual Symposium of the Society of Experimental Test
Pilots was attended. An entire major session was devoted to
operational test and evaluation. This symposium afforded
the opportunity to exchange ideas in the subject area with
numerous key personnel involved in Navy, Air Force, Army,
NASA, and contractor aircraft systems test and evaluation.
Aircraft weapon systems is used herein to refer to the




After completing this preliminary research effort, it
became evident that a high degree of parochialism exists
throughout the Navy's T&E community, with most people
holding views that greatly favored the organization to which
they were presently attached. Since the subject of defi-
ciencies in the Navy's T&E organizations is a popular one,
most people in each T&E activity shared similar ideas in the
subject area. This is perhaps a result of the tremendous
amount of dialogue and the large interchange of ideas that
has taken place in this subject area.
Research was, therefore, confined to personal or tele-
phone interviews with a limited number of personnel involved
in each of the various phases of Navy T&E. Because of the
parochialism that exists within each T&E organization, it
was possible to obtain an accurate cross section of that
organization's opinions of deficiencies in Navy T&E by
interviewing only a few of its people.
Visits were made to the Offices of the Secretary of
Defense, the Offices of the CNO, the Naval Air Systems
Command Headquarters, the Naval Air Test Center, and the
Headquarters, of the Operational Test and Evaluation Force.
Appendix A contains a tabulation of the specific organiza-
tions with which interviews were conducted.
Fifty-seven people were interviewed either In person or
by telephone. Interviews varied in length from fifteen
minutes to three and one-half hours, and telephone conversa-





A. WHAT IS TEST AND EVALUATION?
In order to ensure a common base for understanding the
contents of this thesis, it is necessary to establish some
fundamental definitions. A simple, yet all-inclusive,
definition of test and evaluation which is utilized herein
is the operation of a system or one or more of its components
In a manner as similar as possible to its intended use and
in an environment which approximates as closely as possible
its operating environment for the purpose of gaining informa-
tion to evaluate the performance of that system or component.
The information obtained may be used to give a better under-
standing of the system's capabilities, to identify short-
comings, to develop improvements, to assist in designing
the system's replacements or complements, to learn how to
support and maintain the system, or for developing require-
ments for training personnel in the operation of the system.
Aircraft weapon system T&E can be divided into basically
two types of testing: contractor T&E and military T&E.
Contractor T&E is conducted by the contractor as a necessary
step in his design and development of a weapon system and
also as part of the contract requirements specified by DOD.
Military T&E is that T&E conducted by military personnel to
verify that the system meets the contract requirements and





Aircraft weapon system T&E can also be divided into two
different categories: Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E)
and Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) . Comprehensive
definitions of DT&E and OT&E which are in concurrence with
the most recent DOD Directives are given in Appendix B.
Briefly, DT&E is that T&E conducted by both the contractor
and the military under the auspices of the developing agency
for the purpose of demonstrating that the engineering design
and development are complete, demonstrating that the system
will meet specifications, determining whether the design
risks have been minimized with respect to system producibility,
and estimating the system's military worth.
OT&E is that T&E conducted by the military to estimate a
system's prospective military worth, operational effective-
ness, operational suitability (including compatibility,
interoperability, reliability, maintainability, and logistic
and training requirements), and the need for any design modi-
fications. It is also used to determine optimum weapon
system employment tactics and force structure. OT&E should
be conducted by operational personnel with qualifications
similar to those expected to ultimately operate the system,
and the tests should be conducted in as realistic an opera-
tional environment as possible.
In summary, DT&E can be divided into two types:
contractor conducted DT&E and military conducted DT&E.
Operational Effectiveness is a measure of how well a




OT&E can also be divided into two types: OT&E conducted to
estimate a system's operational potential and OT&E conducted
to determine how to best utilize the system. As a result
of having received the most criticism, OT&E is currently the
type of T&E that is being given major attention. The under-
lying thesis is that the validity of quantitative test data
improves as realism (testing in an operational/combat environ-
ment) is added to the environment of the test program. The
achievement of this objective depends upon one's interpreta-
tion of realism. It is easy to go overboard in the quest for
realism to the extent of actually reducing the efficiency of
the test program and adding needlessly to the cost of the
test program. The current emphasis on OT&E appears motivated
by an overzealous quest for- the achievement of realism in
the test environment.
B. TEST AND EVALUATION CRITICIZED
One of the earliest criticisms of T&E in DOD was made by
the Military Aircraft Panel of the President's Scientific
Advisory Committee (PSAC) in August of 1969. This panel
recommended to the Secretary of Defense that an Operational
Test and Evaluation (OT&E) organization be established in
the office of the Secretary of Defense. It further went on
to say that our lack of preparedness in previous wars could
have been exposed if an adequate program for test and evalu-
ation had existed [Ref. 4].
During this same time frame the Defense Science Board,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Bureau of the Budget, the
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Comptroller General of the United States, and various
Congressional Committees recognized that OT&E had been much
less effective than necessary. Since OT&E is the fianl step
in the research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E)
process, there appeared to be a potentially large pay-off
for performing OT&E more effectively.
Perhaps, the most noteworthy of the T&E studies was
conducted by the President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel
[Ref. 4]. Citing the aforementioned criticisms of T&E and
specifically OT&E, one Task Group of the Blue Ribbon Defense
Panel performed an assessment of how OT&E was being conducted.
It Is interesting to note that this study, which became a
major driving force behind changes to the overall DOD T&E
process, looked only at OT&E rather than the entire DOD
T&E effort.
The main conclusions were: XU
(1) OT&E can and should be planned and executed much more
effectively than it has been in recent years.
(2) OT&E results have not been made available to or used fa
by DOD agencies which need them.
(3) There is a requirement for an OT&E organization at
higher-than-service level.
(4) OT&E within the services is done most effectively when
OT&E Organizations report directly to the Chief of
Service, representing both the developer and user,
but organizationally independent of both .
(5) Inadequate funding has adversely affected the conduct
of needed OT&E.
The panel went on to recommend:
(1) An operational T&E Group should be established with





(2) A Defense Test Agency should be established with broad
authority and responsibility for DOD test activities
giving particular emphasis to OT&E.
(3) The Secretary of Defense should communicate to the
Military Departments the importance he assigns to OT&E
and his conviction that OT&E is best served when
independent OT&E organizations report directly to the
Service Chiefs, Service Secretaries, or both.
The Navy fared best of all services in this study, since
it had in existence an independent OT&E agency, its Opera-
tional Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVPOR) . Even though
the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel demonstrated by many of its
statements a misunderstanding of how the Navy conducted its
T&E (see page 46), their recommendations received almost
universal acceptance.
In 1971 the Government Accounting Office (GAO) responded
to Congressional requests and conducted a study of T&E for
major weapon systems [Ref. 5!K Its main conclusions were:
(1) The practices used in establishing test objectives
were generally inadequate.
(2) Most weapon systems reviewed did not have adequate
plans for testing.
(3) T&E for most weapon systems was not accomplished in
a timely manner.
(4) Complete and valid T&E data was not available to
decision-makers prior to key decision points in the
acquisition cycle.
The GAO report recommended:
(1) Completion of appropriate testing and evaluation prior
to key decision points in the acquisition cycle.
(2) Stringent controls over the granting of any waivers
from required T&E.
(3) Preparation of succinct summary reports by the testing
agency for all levels of management. Interested
management levels may v.'ish to comment on these summary
reports, however, they should not be permitted to
change the basic content.
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The Commission on Government Procurement in 1972
echoed many of the previously cited criticisms [Ref. 2] of
DOD T&E. Its emphasis was on the need to establish an
operational test agency that is independent of the develop-
ment and user organizations.
The main criticisms coming from these studies appear to
have been the lack of adequate "operational" test and
evaluation and the lack of testing "independent" of the
weapon system developers. Consequently, the words "operational"
and "independent" are now used in every directive or instruc-
tion that addresses T&E.
C. NEW HIGH LEVEL T&E POLICY
DOD Directive 5000.1 of July 13, 1971 established a new
policy for the acquisition of major defense systems. In an
attempt to correct deficiencies in DOD T&E cited in the
previously discussed studies, DOD Directive 5000.1 states
the following regarding T&E:
"Test and evaluation shall commence as early as
possible. A determination of operational suitability,
including logistic support requirements, will be made
prior to large-scale production commitments, making
use of the most realistic test environment possible
and the -best representation of the future operational
system available. The results of this operational
testing will be evaluated and presented to the DSARC
at the time of the production decision" [Ref. 1].
Memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense David
Packard provided interim guidance to the services for imple-
menting changes to their respective T&E systems until the
issuance of a specific directive addressing T&E (Directive
22

5000.3 was issued in January 1972). This comprehensive
directive [Ref. 6] covers all phases of DOD test and evalu-
ation and is summarized as follows:
(1) Development test and evaluation is to be planned,
conducted, and monitored by the developing agency
of the DOD Components.
(2) In each DOD Component there will be one major field
agency separate and distinct from the developing/
procuring command which will be responsible for
operational test and evaluation and which will
report results of its independent T&E directly to
the Military Service Chief or Defense Agency
Director.
(3) Operational testing should be separate from develop-
ment testing; however, combined testing may be
conducted where separation would cause delay
Involving unacceptable risk or unacceptable increased
cost.
(4) At least an initial phase of operational test and
evaluation (IOT&E) will be accomplished prior to the
first major production decision sufficient to provide
a valid estimate of expected system operational
effectiveness and suitability.
DOD Component is a term referring to each of the main
organizations that comprise the Department of Defense: Army,
Navy, Air Force, and the Defense Supply Agency, for example.
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(5) The Development Concept Paper (DCP) prepared for use
at the time of the Program Initiation Decision for a
major Defense System will identify the critical
questions and areas of risk to be resolved by test
and evaluation.
(6) When the DOD component proposes to initiate Full-
Scale Development, it must present to the Defense
Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) the results
of T&E accomplished to that date, an updated state-
ment of critical questions and areas of risk still
needing test to be resolved, and a detailed statement
of test plans and milestones.
(7) Prior to the first major production decision DSARC
will assess the adequacy of test results to support
a production decision and the adequacy of plans and
schedules for any remaining testing.
(8) The duties of the Deputy Director Defense Research
and Engineering, Test and Evaluation (DD(T&E)) are
delineated. He has across-the-board responsibility
for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in
test and evaluation matters.
One of the strongest motivating forces behind the changes
that have taken place in DOD's test and evaluation process
has been Congress. The report of the Senate Armed Services
Committee from the 1st session of the Ninety-Second Congress
[Ref. 7] fully supported the findings of the Blue Ribbon
Defense Panel. The Committee reiterated weaknesses in DOD's
24

operational test and evaluation — lack of testing independent
of the weapon system developer, service opposition to inde-
pendent operational test and evaluation, lack of funds and
facilities, and lack of high-level attention and management.
The committee went on to state that insufficient OT&E in the
past had resulted in the production and deployment of some
weapon systems which were too complex to be effective. The
committee reasoned that the military was misled into thinking
its personnel would be able to maintain the systems satis-
factorily, but the level of technical ability required to do
so often exceeded that possessed in sufficient quantity by
the military. The committee reasoned that adequate OT&E
would have revealed this soon enough to make appropriate
changes
.
In the same session of Congress, an amendment to the
1972 procurement authorization bill (Public Law 92-156) was
passed [Ref. 8]. This amendment, Section 506, requires that
additional cost, schedule, and performance data be reported
to Congress in support of the annual budget request and
periodically throughout the year before major system procure-
ment awards, are made [Ref. 9]. The required reports to
Congress, called Congressional Data Sheets, must include
data on OT&E results for each weapon system each year until
procurement is completed. If OT&E has not been conducted,
a statement of the reasons therefore and the results of such




The Fiscal Year (FY) 73 budget request was accompanied
by the newly required supporting program data reports.
While similar supporting data were provided to Congress
previously, PL 92-156 Section 506 standardized this procedure
and made compliance mandatory. In passing this amendment,
the intent of Congress appeared to be to provide a means
of obtaining a broader range of data as a basis to make
informed judgments on the merits of the programs and their
funding requirements [Ref. 9]. However, these Congressional
Data Sheets seem to be somewhat redundant of the information
contained in the Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR's) which
are also required by Congress with copies sent to GAO. The
SAR's have often been late in submission. For this and
other reasons SAR's have proven to be ineffective documents,
but no current move is underway to abolish the SAR. Although
Congress has not changed its methods of acting on the Armed
Service Authorizations or Appropriations Bills since re-
ceiving the Congressional Data Sheets, there is confidence
in the Congress and the GAO that improved communications




III. NAVY IMPLEMENTATION OF T&E POLICY
A. GENERAL
As stated in Section IIB, the Navy was the only service
which had in existence at the time of the Blue Ribbon Panel
Study an independent operational test and evaluation agency.
This was the Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR),
which reported to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). It
was a relatively small organization of approximately 1400
officers and enlisted men and did not maintain its own
test ranges or instrumentation.
It was obvious that the most expedient method to comply
with the DOD directives would the expansion of the role of
OPTEVFOR to do the required OT&E. Appendix C contains a
list of the various instructions and directives that pertain
to Navy Aircraft Weapon System test and evaluation. The
basic content with regards to T&E of a few of these Navy
originated instructions will be discussed in order to show
the Navy's method of implementing the broad T&E guidelines
given by Sec Def in DOD Directives 5000.1 and 5000.3.
B. SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5000.1 [Ref 10]
SECNAV Instruction 5000.1 is the Navy's implementing
instruction of DOD Directive 5000.1. It assigns Commander
Operational Test and Evaluation Force (COMOPTEVFOR) as the
Navy's independent test agency for the required operational
test and evaluation. The general sequence of test and
27

evaluation events under the new acquisition philosophy is
given as follows:
"1. Laboratory/contractor preliminary T&E of bread-
board of demonstration hardware during the conceptual
effort
.
2. Contractor/development activity T&E of subsystems
and/or full-scale demonstrator hardware during full-
scale development.
3. Technical T&E conducted by the contractor with
Navy participation during pre-production/production.
4. IOT&E (Initial Operational Test and Evaluation)
by or with the active participation of Navy operational
forces prior to the major production decision.
5. Navy OPEVAL (Operational Evaluation) prior to
approval for service use and inventory acceptance
(except for ships).
6. Navy follow-on T&E.
7. Conduct of T&E by the Board of Inspection and
Survey (BIS) and recommendation to CNO for service
acceptability" [Ref. 10].
-
C. OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3960.8 [Ref. 11]
OPNAV Instruction 3960.8, issued by CNO, is essentially
the basic Implementing Instruction of DOD Directive 5000.3-
OPNAV Instruction 3960.8 establishes guidance and policy
for T&E of all Navy weapon systems, subsystems, components,
and support systems. Specific areas discussed in this instruc-
tion that are germane to this thesis are discussed below.
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Development test and evaluation (DT&E) is defined as T&E
conducted under the sponsorship of the developing agency
which is undertaken to facilitate the evolution of a system.
The primary objective of DT&E is given as the generation of
essential and valid data upon which to base design decisions
during the development process.
Operational test and evaluation is defined as including
all T&E efforts undertaken for the purpose of obtaining
operational information throughout the system's life cycle.
This T&E is used to support both the acquisition process
and the optimum employment of the system. OT&E is broken
into two phases: IOT&E (Initial Operational T&E) and.FOT&E
(Follow-on Operational T&E).1 IOT&E is defined as that T&E
accomplished by or under the supervision of the Navy's
independent testing agency (OPTEVFOR) prior to the first
major production decision. FOT&E is the continuing T&E of
a weapon system conducted under fleet conditions by opera-
tional personnel in order to verify system performance,
validate correction of deficiencies previously identified,
and refine tactical employment doctrines and requirements
for personnel and training.
Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) is
defined in OPNAV Instruction 3960.8 to include all OT&E
following IOT&E. The useage of the term FOT&E has been
rather limited and is not used in OPNAV Instruction 5M0.47D
or 3930.8B, both dated after OPNAV Instruction 3960.8.
29

The basic objectives of OPTEVFOR participation in T&E
throughout a system's life cycle are given as:
(1) Ensuring that early and realistic operational tests
and evaluations are planned.
(2) Ensuring that appropriate initial operational tests
and evaluations are conducted prior to scheduled
decision milestones, i.e. program initiation
decision, full-scale development decision, and
production decision
(3) Providing an independent assessment of the operational
effectiveness and suitability of the system to the
CNO [Ref. 11].
The role of the Board of Inspection and Survey (BIS)
for conducting acceptance trials on new ships and new model
aircraft prior to Navy acceptance from the contractor is
briefly discussed in this instruction. OPTEVFOR conducts
OT&E to determine operational effectiveness and suitability,
and BIS conducts T&E to determine acceptance for service
use. It is recognized that these are closely related
objectives, and this instruction directs that care be taken
to preclude duplicate testing. One method outlined to
accomplish this is the preparation of the Test and Evaluation
Master Plan (TEMP) which is the responsibility of the
Project Manager who works for the Chief of Naval Material.
Figure 2, adopted from OPNAV Instruction 3960.8, shows
the normal sequence of test events in the acquisition of
an aircraft weapon system.
The Director, RDT&E (OP-098) is assigned as the focal
point for T&E policy and guidance for CNO. Under OP-O98
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specific ressponslbilities of coordinating the overall Navy
T&E effort.
D. OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5^40. 47D [Ref. 12]
OPNAV Instruction 5440. 47D promulgates the mission and
functions of 0PTEVF0R. OPTEVFOR's mission is to "opera-
tionally test and evaluate specific weapon systems, ships,
aircraft and equipments, including procedures and tactics,
where required; and, when directed by CNO, assist development
agencies in the accomplishment of necessary Development T&E"
[Ref. 12].
The Director, RDT&E, (OP-098) is the OPNAV focal point
for the Commander, 0PTEVF0R. C0M0PTEVF0R is, however,
authorized direct access to CNO and all subordinate offices
as necessary to perform his assigned mission.
E. SYNOPSIS OF NAVY IMPLEMENTATION
The Navy had the simplest job of any of the Services in
implementing changes to its T&E process so that it would
conform to the new acquisition philosophy. Basically, the
only organizational change made by the Navy was the creation
of the relatively small (10 officers) OP-983, Test and
Evaluation Division in the office of CNO's Director of
RDT&E. Figure 3 shows the present organizational structure
for the major activities that are involved in aircraft
weapon system T&E. Appendix D contains a summary of the










































The role of OPTEVFOR has been greatly expanded and the
roles of the other Navy T&E agencies have remained essen-
tially unchanged by the implementation of the .new T&E
instructions.
The Program Managers in the S-3A and P—14 programs
faced the challenge of modifying their test programs to
include the new OT&E requirements. In both programs the
leadership displayed by the program office in soliciting
the necessary cooperation from the many T&E agencies was
the primary ingredient which enabled the injection of the
increased OPTEVFOR testing which had not been planned for
previously. In the F-lH program the necessary cooperation
was obtained through the formal establishment of the Joint
Evaluation Team (JET) which was composed of test personnel
from the Naval Air Test Center, Naval Missile Center, and




IV. ASPECTS OF CURRENT NAVY AIRCRAFT T&E POLICY
Many deficiencies still exist in the Navy's T&E process,
and others are being generated as a result of the new T&E
policies. This section will discuss some of the deficiencies
that exist In the Navy's T&E process as well as some of its
enhancing characteristics which have not been changed.
A. ORGANIZATIONAL DEFICIENCIES
Because of the fragmented manner in which aircraft T&E
is organized in the Navy, many problems result. These
include:
(1) The user is inadequately represented
(2) Lack of independence of the T&E organizations
(3) Duplication of T&E responsibilities
(lJ) Inadequate central management of NAVAIR T&E activities
(5) Adequate testing is not assured for non-major
procurements
(6) Requirement for independent T&E often ignores test
agency expertise
(7) No standardization in method of funding T&E agencies
(8) Navy test range management is too fragmented.
These deficiencies are discussed in the following sections.
1 . The 'User is Inadequately Represented
In each Navy procurement a dialogue that is vital
for success is that between the user and the producer. Two
such dialogues must exist: an external dialogue in which
the Navy is the user, and the contractor is the producer,
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and an Internal dialogue In which the operating command is
the user and the acquisition command is the producer.
In the internal user-producer relationship the user
Is responsible for the operation and support of a system
and is consequently also responsible for developing and
stating the needs and concepts for the system. In other
words the user provides the input requirements to which the
producer designs the system. The producer is then responsi-
ble for the design, development, production, and installation
of a system that meets the requirements of the user and
that can be operated and supported cost-effectively. A
constant dialogue must be maintained between the internal
and external user and producer throughout the system's
life cycle [Ref. 3].
The external user-producer relationship is well
defined and does not appear to present any significant prob-
lems in regards to responsibility. However, the internal
user-producer relationship within the Navy is not so well
defined. The Chief of Naval Material (CNM) represents the
producer. The management of the development and production
of a weapon system becomes the responsibility of one of
CNM's System Commands and the specific responsibility of
a Program Manager. The Office of the CNO (OPNAV) represents
the user. Within OPNAV the Director, RDT&E (OP-O98) initially
becomes the Program Sponsor for the development of the
36

system, but he will eventually lose this sponsorhsip to the
ultimate user sponsor. On aircraft programs it is the DCNO
for AIR (OP-05) who will become the ultimate user sponsor,
and he almost always assigns a Program Coordinator from
his office to coordinate each program. The OPNAV Program
Sponsor is responsible for determining program objectives,
time phasing and support requirements, and for appraising
progress, readiness, and military worth of the weapon sys-
tem. The OPNAV role as the representative of the user
(i.e. the operating forces) appears well established up to
the time of a favorable DSARC program initiation decision.
Thereafter, OPNAV often becomes more of a proponent of the
system being developed rather than an impartial representa-
tive of the operating forces. This is especially true in
today's environment in which Congress is taking a more
active role in each major weapon system's development, and
the CNO is compelled to frequently justify each Navy program
to Congress. The opportunistic exploration that is often
made by some members of Congress over any hint of a serious
problem in a weapon system's development adds further to
OPNAV s serving only as a proponent of the system and to
conceal any of its problems.
The transition of Program Sponsorship from OP-O98 to
OP-05 should normally take effect upon the decision to
procure the weapon system for service use. Of necessity
there is a large period of dual interest and activity,
but only one Program Sponsor has final responsibility.
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OPTEVFOR, working for OP-098, Is a test agency
organizationally independent from the developing agency,
CNM. Fortunately, OPTEVFOR is not put in a position like
that of the Program Sponsor where it must conceal system
deficiencies. OPTEVFOR is able to test and evaluate weapon
systems while truly representing the user in determining
if the weapon system is operationally suitable and whether
it fulfills an operational need.
OPTEVFOR, headed by a Rear Admiral, reports to
CNO's Director of RDT&E, a Vice Admiral, who is often forced
into a role where he must conceal weapon system development
problems or risk losing the program at the Congressional
budget hearings. Therefore, much of the valuable user
dialogue that is generated by OPTEVFOR during the latter
stages of a weapon system's development is lost through the
OP-098 filter.
The internal user-producer dialogue during the
latter stages of a weapon system's development often becomes
too producer oriented. The OPNAV program sponsor, forced
into a system proponent role, becomes an ineffective
representative of the user operational forces.
The Navy's unilineal system, in which the operating
forces and the Navy's acquisition forces report to the
CNO, makes a clean separation between the internal user
and producer forces extremely difficult to achieve. The
creation of a bilineal system in which the Chief of Naval




Operations (heading the operating forces) report to a Navy
Chief of Staff appears to be the only complete solution to )
this user-producer dilemma. However, much improvement can
be made under the current unilineal system. It is beyond
the scope of this thesis to discuss a change as drastic as
would be the creation of a bilineal system.
2. Lack of Independence of the T&E Organizations
The need for independent T&E has become a well agreed
upon fact. As discussed in Section IIB much of the T&E
conducted by the Navy has been criticized as being non-
independent in that the test agency worked for the developing
agency.
At the working level within the Navy's T&E structure
there is little concern for lack of independence. No evi-
dence indicates that T&E conducted by any test agency is
biased and that the project team's reported results are not
accurate results of tests conducted to the best of their
ability. Navy program managers attest that the T&E conduc-
ted by the NAVAIR T&E agencies is "independent", i.e. the
P. M. is unable to influence the results. No one has really
questioned the independence of the test personnel and
their ability to conduct and report the actual test results
they obtain. However, Congress has viewed the NAVAIR T&E
agencies as not being independent, since the management
wiring diagram shows them working for the developing agency.
The accurate assumption is that NAVAIR has the power to
completely disregard its DT&E agency test results, and the
DT&E agency has no recourse.
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A complete organizational separation is required
to achieve the independence that is being sought by each of
the critics of the Navy's T&E process. This is exactly what
the Navy did in assigning the increased OT&E responsibility
to OPTEVFOR, an agency that is organizationally separated
from the aircraft developing agencies, NAVAIRSYSCOM and
NAVMAT
.
However, OPTEVFOR is not a truly independent test
organization. The Commander, OPTEVFOR reports to OP-O98,
who is the program sponsor and was shown in the preceding
section to play a producer-oriented system proponent role
during OPTEVFOR' s involvement in the system's development.
Although OPTEVFOR reports the results of its T&E directly
to CNO, which is an acceptable procedure under DOD Directive
5000.3, the OPTEVFOR reporting Chain-of-Command (COMOPTEVFOR -
OP-O98 -»> OP-09 * CNO) is not within the intent of the current
DOD philosophy. If COMOPTEVFOR must report to and through
OP-098, he cannot be considered legitimately independent of
the developing agencies [Ref. 14], since he cannot convey the
results of his T&E with enough force to effect a change in
the system's development.
An examination of OPTEVFOR 's funding and available
physical resources shows further the inability of OPTEVFOR
to perform as a truly independent test agency. OPTEVFOR
does not maintain complete fiscal control and management of
all funding required for OT&E. In fact, all applicable costs
expended for OT&E have never been separately identified.
4

Without control of all the OT&E funding, It would appear
that OPTEVFOR cannot independently plan and conduct OT&E.
In any program whoever controls the funding controls the
destiny of the program.
Lack of control of the major portion of the physical
resources required for OT&E (instrumentation, ranges, data
processing centers, simulators, and test aircraft ) further
reduces the independence of OPTEVFOR. A major portion of
the physical resources utilized by OPTEVFOR is controlled
by the developing agency. Yet, no formal, mechanism exists
for the development of integrated plans for the utilization
of these limited resources by OPTEVFOR and the DT&E agencies.
3. Duplication of T&E Responsibilities
Much duplication of responsibilities exists among
the major participants in the Navy's T&E process: the
contractor, NAVAIR T&E agencies, OPTEVFOR, and Board of
Inspection and Survey (BIS). The limited availability of
personnel and physical T&E resources dictates that the Navy
must eliminate needless duplication in order to achieve
optimal utilization. Flight testing is the most expensive
type of aircraft testing, and this is the area that will be
given primary attention.
The contractor is required to demonstrate satisfac-
torily each segment of an aircraft's flight envelope
i 3&
1Test aircraft are not permanently assigned to OPTEVFOR
for IOT&E but only for follow-on T&E.
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(airspeed, altitude, normal accelerations, gross weights,
etc.) before Navy test pilots are permitted to operate the
aircraft within each flight regime [Ref. 15]. Although
valuable in promoting safety and obtaining additional data
under identical test conditions, this regulation causes many
Navy test flights to be mere duplication of contractor test
flights.
Contractors are routinely required to redemonstrate
compliance with the aircraft's flight structural and perform-
ance requirements at the Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent
River, Maryland, after they have already performed the same
tests at their own facility. This procedure is continually
claimed by contractors to be a superfluous expense which
could be eliminated by having the Navy witness these demon-
strations at the contractor's facility. The Naval Air Test
Center has been an avid supporter of the need for this
duplication of contractor tests for these reasons:
(1) More credence can be placed upon results when tests
are conducted at the Navy's facility rather than the
contractor' s.
(2) These limited demonstrations verify the contractor's
instrument calibrations and put more credibility on
all data collected at the contractor's facility.
Compounding the contractor flight demonstration
problem is the inability of the various Navy Plant Repre-
sentative Offices (NAVPRO's) to witness competently all of
the contractors' flight test demonstrations. This is the
result of the limited flight test and aerodynamic expertise




would, therefore, be required to send numerous qualified
personnel to witness these types of demonstrations if they
were conducted only at the contractor's facility.
The distinction between OT&E and DT&E implies two
markedly different approaches to T&E which requires the need
for separate test programs [Ref. 16]. Therefore, OT&E has
been conducted primarily by OPTEVFOR and DT&E by the NAVAIR
T&E agencies. Prior to DOD Directive 5000.1, there was a
certain amount of duplication in the test programs of
OPTEVFOR and the NAVAIR T&E agencies. This was unavoidable
since completely different people were conducting tests on
the same system, and a learning curve had to be developed
by each of the respective testers. This same type of dupli-
cation exists today and will continue to exist as long as
separate agencies are performing tests on the same weapon
systems
.
Before DOD Directive 5000.1, the tests were conducted
in a sequential order and little overlap existed between the
time-phasing of the tests conducted by the NAVAIR T&E agencies
and OPTEVFOR. With the current requirement of conducting
Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) prior to the
production decision, the amount of time overlap between
OPTEVFOR and NAVAIR testing has greatly expanded. Figure 4
gives a presentation of the conduct of the various phases of
T&E before DOD 5000.1 and today.
The increased time overlap has increased the amount
of duplication in testing. In the case of an aircraft both
^3
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OPTEVFOR and NAVAIR test agency flight crews (each agency
needs more than one flight crew to assure corroboration of
subjective evaluations) must conduct tests concurrently
throughout the aircraft's evolution —prototype to production
model — and the many iterations of design in between.
Valuable flight test time must consequently be devoted to
developing each flight crew's experience with each iteration
of design in the aircraft prior to conducting meaningful
tests.
The most obvious duplication in Navy T&E is the
very similar testing objectives that exist for both BIS and
OPTEVFOR. BIS, utilizing NAVAIR T&E agencies to perform the
test and evaluation, is responsible to "discover and report
deficiencies at the earliest possible time so that corrective
action can be taken to ensure that aircraft delivered to
operating units will be capable of carrying out the intended
mission..." and to "recommend to the Secretary of the Navy
the conditions of acceptance or rejection of a model aircraft
for service use" [Ref. 17]. The majority of the pilots
conducting the tests for BIS are graduates of the U. S. Navy
Test Pilot School where they are taught to test for service
suitability first and contract compliance second.
OPTEVFOR is responsible through its IOT&E for asses-
sing the operational suitability of an item prior to the
production decision and to "evaluate the operational effec-
tiveness, suitability, and capability of tested weapons




The difference between BIS's service suitability
testing and OPTEVFOR's operational suitability testing is
not apparent. The difference between BIS's testing for
specification compliance and OPTEVFOR's testing against the
stated needs and performance criteria is also not apparent.
With the testing objectives being so similar, one can only
expect duplication in the testing. Confusion often exists
as to what testing is OT&E and what is DT&E, which tends to
conceal much of the duplication in T&E responsibility. This
confusion is illustrated by a quote from the Blue Ribbon
Defense Panel which erroneously thought BIS was conducting
OT&E. "Before Navy aircraft and ships are approved for use
by the operational forces, they are subjected to another
kind of operational evaluation which is much closer to true
OT&E. This is done by a Board of Inspection and Survey (BIS),
which is composed of experienced officers with appropriate
Navy backgrounds" [Ref. 4, p. 23].
In attacking the problem of duplication of T&E
responsibilities, the objective should not be to eliminate
all overlap or duplication. It should, however, be to ensure
that where such overlap or duplication exists, it is visible,
controlled, purposeful, and contributes to improving the
overall T&E process.
l\. Inadequate Central Management of HAVAIR T&E Activities
The Naval Air Systems Command Test and Evaluation
Coordinator was formally established in 1968. The Commander,
Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, Maryland, was assigned
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this additional duty, and was given a T&E Coordinator's
staff to assist in the performance of these duties which
were separate and distinct from the other functions performed
at Patuxent River. The creation of the T&E Coordinator
stemmed from the recognition of the lack of a single focal
point or reviewing authority for T&E in NAVAIR and the
consequential lack of coordination among the NAVAIR T&E
agencies [Ref. 18].
The NAVAIR T&E Coordinator's Charter [Ref. 19]
designates the T&E Coordinator as the focal point for all
NAVAIRSYSCOM responsibilities in the coordination of T&E
matters. It should be observed, however, that the T&E i
Coordinator is only a coordinator and has no line management
authority over any of the NAVAIR T&E agencies, except NATC
which he commands. The T&E Coordinator is responsible for
assisting in the preparation of test planning in order to
ensure optimum utilization of resources and minimum duplica-
tion of tests. However, the T&E Coordinator only recommends
which agency should do the tests, and NAVAIR makes the final
determination.
The lack of a single management focal point for T&E
within the internal NAVAIR organization continues to exist.
Since NAVAIR has refused to delegate to the T&E Coordinator
the authority to manage its T&E activities, many duplications
of testing responsibilities exist and needless interagency
conflict often exists. For example, NATC and NMC are
assigned similar missions [Ref. 15, P- G-13]:
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NATC: "Coordinate and perform test and evaluation
of aircraft weapons systems, their components
and related equipment, ..."
NMC: "To perform test, evaluation, development support
and exercise engineering cognizance as assigned
of Naval weapons, weapon systems, and related
devices."
NMC has test responsibility for missiles and the
interfaces with the various launch platforms (aircraft)
while NATC has test responsibility for the aircraft and the
interfaces with the various weapons that it will deliver.
Because of the large overlap in responsibility, much conflict
has arisen in the past between Weapon System Test (WST - a
division of NATC) and NMC. Participants in the F-lVPhoenix
Missile Test program have stated that more conflict existed
between these two NAVAIR T&E agencies than between either
NATC or NMC and VX-4 who reports to OPTEVFOR.
Another example of NAVAIR duplication of testing
responsibilities exists in the area of aeromedicine. Below
is a list of the agencies directly involved with the T&E
of life support and aircrew protective equipment:
Naval Aerospace Recovery Facility, El Centro, CA . -
conducts DT&E on escape and recovery systems
(see Appendix D)
NATC - Aeromed Branch of Service Test Division
NMC - Life Support and Life Sciences Department
NADC, Warminster - Although not reporting directly to
NAVAIR, NADC receives approximately 85 percent
of its funding from NAVAIR and does extensive
development and testing in the field of
aeromedicine
Each of these agencies is involved with the development and
T&E in the aeromedical area. The need to have aeromedical
capabilities and expertise at each of these facilities is
i|8

questioned as needless duplication which is permitted to
exist and expand because no central authority is controlling
NAVAIR's T&E activities.
5. Requirements for Independent T&E Often
Ignore Test Agency Expertise
LTGEN Alfred Starbird (USA-Ret) is the Deputy
Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Test and
Evaluation (DD(T&E)) in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) . As DD(T&E) he has become a main driving
force in ensuring that each of the Services conduct T&E in\
accordance with DOD Directive 5000.3.
DD(T&E) is responsible for reporting to the DSARC
"at each major milestone decision point his assessment as to
the adequacy of the identified critical issues and questions
to be resolved by test and evaluation, test plans and
schedules, and the adequacy of the accomplished T&E to
justify the action recommended for that milestone decision"
[Ref. 6]. OPTEVFOR, as the Navy's independent operational
T&E agency, is the main source of DD(T&E)*s T&E data.
Although much of the development agency's T&E data are made
available to DD(T&E), it is the OPTEVFOR evaluation that is
required before DD(T&E) will be satisfied that adequate T&E
has been accomplished to meet a milstone T&E objective. In
the event of a conflict, the OPTEVFOR opinion will take
precedence
.
As will be discussed in Section IV. B. 4, OPTEVFOR
often lacks the technical expertise to conduct a particular
test of a system or subsystem. Yet DD(T&E) has, in the past,
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required that OPTEVFOR conduct an evaluation before continu-
ing with the development program, since DD(T&E) was not
satisfied with only the results from an NATC (a developer's
T&E agency) evaluation. In other words, OPTEVFOR is being
tasked to conduct T&E on the basis of its independence
rather than on its testing capability. The result of such
actions is that OPTEVFOR is being compelled to build up its
technical expertise and expand its testing capabilities into
areas where this capability and expertise exists in other
test agencies.
The distinction between OT&E and DT&E is not always
apparent. Many T&E milestones for aircraft procurements
could easily be shown to be met by conducting only so called
development testing; e.g. meeting a performance requirement
of maximum airspeed or altitude. However, as long as DD(T&E)
requires the opinion of the independent test agency, OPTEVFOR,
the Navy will be forced to increase the capability of
OPTEVFOR. This will, in turn, further increase the duplica-
tion of responsibilities between OPTEVFOR and the development
test agencies.
6. Adequate Testing is Not Assured for Non-Major y^
Procurements
DOD Directive 5000.1 and the various implementing
instructions pertain to major programs (RDT&E cost in excess
of 50 million dollars or production cost in excess of 200
million dollars). However, all the directives state that
the principles are to applied to all programs. Since DSARC




system to ensure that adequate and independent T&E is
conducted prior to making the advanced development or the
production decision for non-major programs.
The lack of any explicit policy for T&E of non-major
systems has given considerable latitude to the Program
Manager. Many projects are not subject to automatic project
assignment by CNO, and consequently OPTEVFOR is often not
cognizant of the existence of projects or their need for
operational evaluation. OP-983 publishes a quarterly list
of all assigned RDT&E projects to be prosecuted by OPTEVFOR,
J
but no means exists for ensuring that every project requiring
an operational evaluation is so assigned. What this means is
that the Program Manager is able to conduct inadequate T&E,
or he can even obtain T&E from a number of agencies until he
receives the results he desires; and his actions may not even
be criticized.
Without questioning the integrity of the Navy's
Program Managers, one can certainly speculate on the outcome
of a situation where the Program Manager is typically facing
a cost growth combined with a slippage in schedule but has
no clearly established requirement to obtain an "independent"
test and evaluation of his system. His likely course of
action would be to obtain the least expensive (to his program)
suitable T&E that is available. Within the current Navy T&E
structure many avenues to conduct T&E are open to the Program
Manager: a IIAVAIR T&E agency, OPTEVFOR, or a fleet unit.
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The following is an example which occurred in 1970
in the development of the night carrier landing simulator
for the A-7E airplane. The Program Manager had the fleet
replacement A-7 training squadron (VA-122) conduct the Navy's
test and evaluation. The Naval Air Test Center and speci-
fically the Carrier Suitability Branch, the technical experts
for testing aircraft and associated systems for use in the
carrier environment, did not participate in the test and
evaluation of the night carrier landing simulator. The
VA-122 T&E was certainly less expensive than would have been
T&E conducted by a NAVAIR test agency. In addition the
likelihood of uncovering deficiencies (costly to the Program
Manager to correct) with the simulator was far less by having
untrained testers conducting the evaluation than it would
have been if the critical voice of NATC had been given the
opportunity to speak. Although the A-7E night carrier
landing simulator has proven to be a valuable system, the
example does illustrate how the Program Manager has the
latitude to bypass his own NAVAIR test agencies as well as
OPTEVPOR.
Another illustration of the Acquisition Manager's
(the Program Manager for lower cost programs) latitude in
conducting T&E is the case of the HLU-196A/E Powered Bomb
Hoist. The success of this hoist is essential for the
implementation of the Improved Rearming Rate Program aboard
the Navy's attack carriers. T&E of the Bomb Hoist was
conducted by NATC and the Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility
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(NWEF) [Ref. 20]. NATC recommended against clearance of
the HLU-196A/E for use with all explosive ordnance and NWEF
recommended restriction against use of the hoist with
nuclear weapons until certain safety deficiencies were
corrected. Yet, the feature article of the April 1973
edition of Naval Aviation News [Ref. 21] reported that
carrier testing of the HLU-I96A/E had been very successful
and implied that NATC and NWEF had obtained similar results
in their tests. Apparently the four-day HLU-196A/E evalua-
tion conducted aboard USS Enterprise during combat operations
by operational Navy ordnancemen showed the HLU-I96A/E to be
very effective. The design deficiencies (high failure possi-
bility of two critical springs) which NATC and NWEF considered
to have such an adverse effect on safety never showed up in
this "operational evaluation."
It appears that the Acquisition Manager was unwilling
to accept the negative T&E results from NATC and NWEF. Hope-
fully, the serious design deficiencies in the HLU-I96A/E can
and will be corrected before a catastrophic accident occurs.
One would like to believe that the acquisition manager has
not considered his system's design complete, merely because
someone was found to report his system as being a "significant
step toward a mobile automatic weapons loader" [Ref. 21,
p. 14], However, the Navy's acquisition process for non-major
procurement provides an inadequate check to protect against
prematurely terminating the correction of deficiencies.
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7. Methods of Funding
As pointed out in Section IV. A. 2 and IV. A. 3, the
costs for conducting T&E cannot be totally identified.
Further compounding the situation is the fact that many
different methods are used for funding the various T&E
agencies. Some development T&E agencies are operated under
Navy Industrial Funding where both direct and indirect costs
are charged to each T&E project, and the funds are then
transferred from the respective Program Manager. Other
agencies utilize industrial funding where only direct
charges are incurred by the project, while still others
never even charge military personnel working directly on
the project as a direct cost to the project. Consequently,
the cost to conduct T&E varies significantly from agency to
agency.
In the past, Program Managers have been forced by
monetary constraints to have certain tests conducted by a
T&E agency which was not as well suited to perform the T&E,
but whose funding method resulted in much lower cost for
the Program Manager and his particular program. However, it
is quite possible that the overall cost to the Navy might
have actually been higher, but this is not determined or
considered in the Program Manager's decision making process.
Obviously a system which forces a Program Manager to make
decisions based upon cost tradeoffs must reflect realistic
costs which, when compared, enable the Program Manager to
make decisions which give valid cost savings.
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The funding for OPTEVFOR is different from that of
the development T&E agencies in that more funding sources
are involved. The VX Squadrons, the Air Test and Evaluation
Squadrons that conduct aircraft T&E for COMOPTEVFOR, receive
part of their funding from their respective Type Commanders
(COMNAVAIRPAC or COMNAVAIRLANT) . Fleet Commanders also fund
OPTEVFOR indirectly through their Operating and Maintenance
(O&M) funds by providing fleet services and support for OT&E.
The remainder of OPTEVFOR funding comes from the various
Systems Commands to support OT&E on a project by project
basis [Ref. 15]. As long as the funding for OT&E is not
centrally managed, OT&E will not have fiscal accountability,
and cost-effectiveness trade-offs for conducting different
types of T&E will be nearly impossible to perform.
8. Navy Test Range Management
Appendix E contains a list of the major Navy ranges
and physical test facilities that are utilized in aircraft
weapon system T&E. The ranges are controlled by a number of
different commands. The only central range authority is the
Naval Material Command (NAVMAT) Navy Range Manager, who only
has line management control over the NAVMAT and NAVAIRSYSCOM
controlled ranges. It is significant to note that OPTEVFOR
does not have control over any range or physical test
facility. Consequently, OT&E is conducted at ranges and
facilities which are primarily development T&E oriented.




or facility requirements, rather than on the basis of what
is required for optimal OT&E.
The cost to operate the ranges and physical facilities
cannot be isolated, since they are buried in the budgets of
the various controlling agencies. Without central range
management or knowledge of the overall operating costs, it
is a near impossible task to justify the various ranges and
make rational decisions when forced to reduce range assets.
Since the ranges available for military use determine the
location and the functions of the various T&E facilities,
this area is critical to T&E. During this period of increased
civilian interest in the vast amount of real estate controlled
by the military, it behooves the Navy to devote its best
efforts to ensure that adequate ranges and facilities will
exist for T&E in the future.
The under-utilization of many test ranges makes them
candidates for elimination or conversion to some other use.
The General Services Administration is conducting a continual
survey to identify under-utilized and/or poorly utilized real
property holdings of all Government agencies [Ref. 22]. The
Navy must determine its total Navy Range requirements, and
then determine if it has an excess or a shortage. With so
many Navy agencies controlling ranges and facilities, it
becomes a difficult task to separate the actual Navy range
requirements from the internally generated requirements where




Besides the organizational features of the Navy's T&E
process many other phenomena exist which cause the Navy's
T&E process to be deficient. This section will discuss
these other deficiencies:
(1) Overlap between DT&E and OT&E
(2) Inadequate Test Planning
(3) Inadequate operational test objectives
(4) Inadequate technical expertise in OPTEVFOR
(5) Lack of a Weapon System Test and Evaluation School *
(6) Late test results
(7) BIS scheduled prior to DSARC III
(8) Shortage of analysts
(9) T&E not always treated as a continuing process
1. Overlap Between OT&E and DT&E
Perhaps the greatest problem facing military T&E
today is the lack of a uniform understanding of the differ-
ences between OT&E and DT&E. The definition of OT&E and
DT&E presented in Appendix B may seem quite explicit to the
uninitiated. The consensus throughout the Navy's aircraft
T&E community, however, is that the major portion of T&E
conducted by the military falls somewhere in a "grey area"
that is not purely DT&E nor purely OT&E.
Since the majority of T&E, therefore, is conducted
in an area that is not clearly the responsibility of the
DT&E agency or the OT&E agency, parochial attitudes are
typical and often hinder cooperative testing. Each agency
attempts to lay claim to the larger or certainly the more
desirable portions of the system's particular testing
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equirements. There exists a definate tendency for opera-
ional test pilots to want to become more involved with the
ore glamorous experimental or developmental testing,
ecently, more and more pilots with only VX/operational T&E
ckgrounds have been accepted for membership in the Society
f Experimental Test Pilots, an organization which requires
Ktensive experience in developmental or experimental flight
*sting for full membership. These VX pilots have acquired
le requisite experimental and developmental test pilot
xperience, but they did it while in operational test pilot
Lllets.
A similar tendency exists on the part of the develop-
mt test agencies. The development test pilot/NFO (Naval
Light Officer) resents being put into the current situation
lere he feels that he is asked only for technical opinions,
id OPTEVFOR is relied upon for operational opinions. The
jvelopmental T&E project officers have operational back-
ounds comparable with those of the operational T&E project
'fleers in OPTEVFOR. The only significant difference is
lat the DT&E project officers spend a year in Test Pilot
:hool after leaving their last operational billet and prior
being assigned to a DT&E agency. Consequently, the DT&E
'oject officers adamantly refuse to accept roles that are
Jolated from operational suitability, and they tailor their
ssts to look at the operational aspects as well as the
:chnical aspects of a weapons system.
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This cross-pollination of mission roles between the
DT&E agencies and OPTEVFOR probably causes each side to
become better "military T&E" organizations. However, the
U. S. Navy cannot afford the luxury of developing this
expensive duplication. As long as separate agencies are
being tasked to perform T&E which does not lend itself to
an easy separation into DT&E and OT&E, parochialism will
continue to grow at the expense of T&E efficiency in terms
of cost and performance
.
2. Inadequate Test Planning
DOD Directives 5000.1 and 5000.3 require early
planning for T&E. Prior to the DSARC I Program Initiation
decision the critical questions and areas of risk that have
to be resolved by T&E must be identified. At this time the
test objectives, schedules, and milestones must also be
determined. This can only be accomplished through extensive
early test planning with the assistance of the T&E agencies.
Unfortunately, the T&E agencies are not involved in
the early stages of test planning. A Test and Evaluation
Master Plan (TEMP) is required to be prepared as early as
possible in the acquisition cycle. It is a management docu-
ment which describes how and when developmental and opera-
tional test objectives will be met, and its preparation Is
the responsibility of the development agency's Program
Manager [Ref. 11]. The T&E agencies become involved only
through a review and comment process rather than being
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intimately involved in determining test objectives and how
best to determine if they are met
.
n
To translate this situation into the commercial
DOD market place, when DOD procures something for a contrac-
tor, the user, in this case DOD, tells the contractor or
producer what tests will be performed to demonstrate the
acceptability of the particular item. The contractor may
assist in the structuring of the tests or in recommending
substitute tests, but the responsibility for test planning
to determine service suitability clearly must remain with
DOD. In going back to the Navy's internal situation, a
similar situation should but does not exist. The producer,
in this case the developing agency, has the responsibility
of preparing the test plan for each particular system. The
user, in this case OPNAV, merely assumes a review and comment
role.
Certainly the Program Manager must retain the
responsibility for test scheduling and for satisfactorily
meeting the test objectives. However, the user and the
T&E experts should have the primary responsibility for the
determination of the test objectives and how, when, where,
and by whom they can best be tested to determine if they are
being met satisfactorily.
3. Inadequate Operational Test Objectives
The preceding section discussed the inadequacy of
test planning in the early stages of a system's development.
This has a most adverse effect on OT&E. Very frequently
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OPTEVFOR is tasked to perform an "operational evaluation"
on a system or subsystem, but a standard against which to
test does not exist. Unfortunately, the operational require-
ments for many weapon systems are never well promulgated nor
explicitly defined.
The Specific Operational Requirement (SOR) is the
requirement document from CNO to which a system is designed.
The SOR is supposed to define the required weapon system
capability in terms of mission requirements, operational
concept, and performance constraints [Ref. 23]. It would
appear that the SOR would be the "standard" against which
OPTEVFOR could design its tests. In reality, the SOR is
often incomplete or outdated by the time the system is ready
for any T&E, or the SOR has not been written and approved
by the time T&E has commenced. One further deficiency is
that the SOR usually contains little in the way of test
planning or test objectives — that is left entirely to the
developing agency in its response to the SOR, the Technical
Development Plan (TDP).
The TDP is the developing agency's management docu-
mentation of its proposed actions and procedures, and the
resources which are required in order to achieve the capa-
bility described in the SOR. The TDP is a primary planning
document for the development, production, installation,
integrated logistic support, reliability and maintainability,
personnel training, and test and evaluation of the weapon
system [Ref. 23]. The in-depth analysis that goes into the
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TDP translates the requirements of the SOR (if one exists)
into specific performance and development objectives
against which DT&E agencies can test. However, the TDP is
not the document against which OPTEVFOR should be testing.
A comprehensive analysis should be conducted early
in the requirements determination phase (Conceptual Phase)
to develop operational effectiveness criteria. These cri-
teria would serve the valuable function for establishing
a general method to evaluate and assess whether the system's
development is meeting the operational needs. Operational
effectiveness criteria should facilitate the writing of a
flexible test plan which is required by OT&E. The SOR or a
suitable replacement document should contain such operational
effectiveness criteria. This is clearly the role of the user,
i.e., OPNAV, and it should not be delegated to the developing
agency
.
4. Inadequate Technical Expertise in OPTEVFOR
There appears to be a common belief that the main
requirement for an OT&E project officer is that he possess
current fleet operational experience. While extensive
operational experience is a necessity for the molding of a
competent OT&E project officer, his training should also
include schooling in the technical disciplines that are
involved in his project; aeronautics, electronics, physics,
and test methods (including statistics and test design).
It is a well established requirement that the




Officers) involved with DT&E are graduates of a formal Test
Pilot School where the discipline of T&E is taught as are
also many basic technical fundamentals. In addition each
DT&E agency has an extensive civilian technical work force
which is composed of aeronautical, mechanical, and electrical
engineers, mathematicians, physicists, and computer special-
ists. An in-depth technical background has been recognized
by the DT&E agencies as an absolute requirement for con-
ducting T&E of a sophisticated weapon system.
Many OPTEVFOR project officers believe that opera-
tional test objectivity is decreased as technical expertise
is increased. However, the increased T&E role that OPTEVFOR
is being forced to fulfill is causing OPTEVFOR to recognize
the need to increase its level of technical expertise. The
number of project officers possessing both operational
experience and technical capability must be expanded if
OPTEVFOR is going to fulfill adequately its T&E objectives
while efficiently utilizing test resources.
By designing efficient test plans, millions of
dollars can often be saved, while obtaining even more
conclusive results. The design of such test plans cannot
be accomplished by personnel possessing only a primary
attribute of recent operational experience. Operational
testing should be conducted by personnel having similar
qualifications to those who will ultimately utilize the
system, but this should not preclude personnel from possessing
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the requisite technical capabilities from designing and
planning the tests and analyzing and evaluating the results.
OPTEVFOR recently evaluated a system in USS Ranger.
The system's performance was believed to be affected by
latitude, longitude, look angle, and other parameters.
Testing for latitude and longitude effects would necessitate
relocating the test force all over the world. Fortunately
a project officer assigned to this program had an excellent
technical background. He was able to show by some relatively
simple preliminary tests that both latitude and longitude
had an insignificant effect on one performance parameter in
question. Latitude and longitude would affect this parameter
only as a result of the consequential changes in look angle.
This knowledge could provide considerable cost savings, since
only look angle must be varied to complete this portion of
the test. One can only wonder how many tests consist of
expensive testing for the effects of parameters which could
have been shown to be insignificant by a skilled analyst.
Another area where OPTEVFOR' s technical expertise is
lacking is in the testing of computer programs (software),
which have become an integral part of every current weapon
system. The results of inadequately designed tests of these
weapon systems will not show where system problems exist,
i.e. in the computer program, in the hardware, in the operating
procedures, etc. If one is going to expend the effort and cost
to conduct the tests, it is only logical to expect that the
results will be able to show where problems exist, not merely
6H

that the system operation is good or bad. In order to
design adequate operational or developmental tests for
computer software, an in-depth knowledge of the system
operation is required, as is also a good basic understanding
of the technical principles Involved.
Technical expertise in OPTEVFOR can be increased by
obtaining more civilian analysts and other technical special-
ists and by increasing the formal training given to the
project officers. The assignment of only one civilian, an
analyst, to each OPTEVFOR VX squadron is an inadequate core
of technical expertise around which the VX squadron can
perform efficiently and effectively. The recent efforts by
OPTEVFOR to obtain more officers with graduate technical
degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School is a move in the
right direction, but much more emphasis has to be given to
this area.
5. Lack of a Weapon System T&E School
Very little formal training is required or is given
before project officers are assigned to an OPTEVFOR project.
VX-*! project officers are probably the most formally trained
in OPTEVFOR. They usually attend a two week training
program at Deputy COMOPTEVFOR, North Island, California and
then a formal three day training course on the operation and
utilization of the Pacific Missile Range (PMR), their primary
test site. But the main part of every OPTEVFOR project
officer's training is "on-the-job training" — also called
"learning from one's own mistakes." In the T&E environment
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mistakes are too costly a teaching tool. It costs approxi-
mately $36,000 per hour to utilize the PMR. This should
compel any user to ensure that his tests are conducted as
efficiently and expeditiously as possible with minimal
likelihood of having to repeat.
Although the majority of DT&E agency project officers
have attended a formal one year course of study at a Test
Pilot School, the knowledge they receive is primarily in the
discipline of aircraft flying qualities and performance T&E.
While this is essential to anyone becoming a project officer
in the Plight Test Division of NATC, approximately two-thirds
of the U. S. Navy Test Pilot School graduates go to project
officer jobs where there is very little need to utilize any
of the flying quality and performance test techniques. What
is lacking in the training of these project officers is
extensive training in the T&E of complex weapons systems.
The U. S. Navy Test Pilot School has introduced a course
entitled Integrated Weapons Systems, but it composes only
7 percent of the formal classroom instruction time and serves
the purpose of giving the student only an introduction into
the complex field of weapon system T&E (as opposed to aircraft
vehicle T&E)
.
As with OPTEVFOR "on-the-job training" then becomes
the primary training method for the DT&E project officer who
becomes involved with weapon system testing. But the DT&E
project officer has many distinct advantages over his OPTEVFOR
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counterpart. The Test Pilot School has given the DT&E
project officer considerable knowledge and experience in
the field of T&E (i.e., how to plan, conduct, and analyze
tests efficiently), and it has also taught him how to write
concise, accurate test reports.
DT&E project officers receive more formal training
than their OPTEVFOR counterparts. However, a significant
deficiency exists in the training of both types of project
officers. Nowhere are they taught how to test a complex
weapon system, how to separate computer software problems
ffrom system hardware problems, how to design an optimal test
using a statistical design of experiments approach, etc.
Not only do the project officers receive inadequate
formal training, but so do the civilian engineers throughout
the T&E community. Most of the civilian engineers working
in the Flight Test Division of NATC complete the entire
academic curriculum of the Navy Test Pilot School. However,
formal training in T&E does not exist for civilian engineers
at other T&E agencies. Although the civilians possess
technical or engineering degrees, very few civilians
reporting to a T&E agency have had any prior experience or
training in the discipline of T&E. Consequently, costly
on-the-job training in T&E is again the technique utilized to
train the civilian engineers and analysts.
6 . Late Test Results '
The new DOD T&E policies are intended to correct the
deficiency of T&E being conducted too late to affect the
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system's development. However, Program Managers are still
plagued with the problem of not getting test results soon
enough from the test agencies which they have requested to
conduct certain tests. This is usually not a problem with
NPE or BIS reports where the schedule for report submission
is very rigid, and all T&E agencies are forced to comply.
The problem arises with the myriad of minor T&E projects
that are conducted during every major weapon system's
development. The test reports from the DT&E agencies go
through such a lengthy review process that they are frequently
received by the Program Manager too late to assist in his
decision making process. Figure 5 shows a typical DT&E agency
test report review chain.
Not every test report is required to follow the
complete review chain, but all of the test reports dealing
with important projects do follow it. Some type of formal
review chain is an absolute requirement to ensure that the
test agency's main output, test and evaluation reports, do
not fall below the established minimum level of quality,
and to ensure that misleading statements or statements not
supported by data are not made in the reports. However,
when the review chain becomes so time consuming that it
becomes the major obstacle in the conduct of T&E, a signi-
ficant change should be made
.
7. BIS Scheduled Prior to DSARC III
OPNAVINST 3960.8 shows BIS commencing along with
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(See Figure 2). The function of the OPEVAL is to determine
if the system is ready for production, and the function of
BIS is to determine if the production aircraft are acceptable
for service use and whether the system's contract specifica-
tions have been met [Refs. 2 and 20],
If this instruction is to be followed in regard to
the time sequencing of BIS and OPEVAL, the functions of BIS
aircraft trials will have to be modified. However, if it is
modified so as to fulfill a function prior to the major
production decision, this function would obviously have to
be related to determining whether a favorable production
decision should be made. As discussed previously (Section
IV. A. 3), the roles of BIS and OPTEVFOR are too similar at
present, and such a change to the function and objectives
of BIS would exacerbate the duplication that already exists
between the function of BIS and the functions of OPEVAL.
The other alternative is to have BIS remain as service
acceptance trials and have it occur after OPEVAL, which is
a radical change from the current sequence of aircraft T&E.
;8. Shortage of Analysts
The requirement to utilize statistical analysts for
designing tests and analyzing the data for statistical
significance has long been known and practiced by OPTEVFOR.
The' DT&E agencies are still living in a world where they
believe "everything" is deterministic, and very seldom is
the statistical aspect of data fully analyzed. This is
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typical of the entire scientific and engineering community.
Only within the last five to ten years has emphasis been
placed upon the probabilistic aspects of engineering.
The DT&E agencies need to devote more attention to
the investigation of the statistical aspects of their tests.
A large amount of DT&E testing is done where statistics
(i.e. means, variances, confidence levels) are calculated,
but a statistical analyst i'sseldom if ever used to verify
the credibility of the test. While a large part of "our
world" might be distributed normally, in many instances
this assumption can lead to some significant errors in the
conclusions one draws from data.
Although OPTEVPOR has recognized the need for
analysts, it still has serious T&E problems that can be
traced to the lack of sufficient analysis expertise. There
is presently one civilian analyst assigned to each VX
squadron and four military and four civilian analysts (two
are permanent Government Service employees) assigned to
OPTEVFOR Headquarters staff [Ref. 14], The problem with the
analysts is twofold: (1) low experience level, and
(2) inadequate numbers of analysts to perform all required
functions.
Populations of random variables are distributed according
to different types of statistical distributions. The Gaussian
or Normal distribution is one of the most common and a great
many test parameters and conditions can accurately be
described by the Normal distribution. However, normality
should always be tested for and not merely assumed.
Incorrectly assuming a Normal distribution when some other
distribution is appropriate could lead to erroneous conclusions
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The civilian analysts assigned to the VX squadrons
and two assigned to OPTEVFOR headquarters work for the
Operations Evaluation Group (OEG), a part of the Center for
Naval Analysis (CNA) . These OEG representatives are assigned
to OPTEVFOR for a two year period (recently increased from
only one year). For the OEG representative this two year
period is his field experience tour. Generally, the OEG
personnel are relatively junior when they are assigned to
OPTEVFOR, and consequently a large amount of their time is
spent in on-the-job training. The best career promotion
opportunity for the OEG personnel appears to exist when they
are assigned to jobs within CNA headquarters. Consequently,
there is little motivation for an OEG representative to
continue working for OPTEVFOR despite the fact that he may
find his job challenging, rewarding, and essetnial. As a
result of these circumstances, the experience level and
caliber of the OEG representatives assigned to OPTEVFOR is
less than desired.
The shortage of analysts precludes utilizing an
analyst's expertise to design each of the test plans;
although the analyst may try to review each test plan prior
to its execution. In practice the majority of OPTEVFOR
test plans are constructed by going through the files and
modifying/copying a previously executed test plan. As a
result, many tests are inadequately planned.
Many times the analyst is not consulted until after
the test has been completed, and he is then asked to
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determine what the data show. This is inadequate, since
the test has to be designed to obtain data in a fashion
that will permit data analysis from which valid conclusions
can be drawn. However, even OPTEVFOR's Project Instruction
Volume II [Ref. 24], which is a comprehensive handbook for
conducting OT&E and analyzing the data, essentially overlooks
this essential part of T&E, the design of the experiment .
As a result of the lack of an adequate number of
capable analysts to design the tests and then analyze the
data, needless expenses are often incurred, and incorrect
conclusions can easily result. An example of needless
expense is the recent OPTEVFOR testing of a missile which
was supposed to demonstrate a kill probability of 0.4.
Fifteen missiles were obtained to conduct the tests and all
fifteen were fired. The test personnel reasoned that if six
or more "hits" were obtained, a kill probability of 0.4 or
greater would have been demonstrated. (6 hits/15 Missile
Firings = Hit or Kill Probability Pk = 0.4.) A simple
sequential test could have been designed where the firing
of each missile was dependent upon the results of the
previous firings. After each firing one of the following
decisions could be made: accept the hypothesis that Pk is
greater than or equal to 0.4, reject the hypothesis, or fire
another missile. As an illustration of this test plan assume
the first six missiles resulted in misses. This would
demonstrate at a 95 percent confidence level that the kill
probability is less than the required 0.4. This result is
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obtained by using the binomial distribution with six failures
out of six attempts and a test hypothesis that Pk is greater
than or equal to 0.4. In this case, it would be a needless
expense to fire any more than six missiles. If all fifteen
missiles were fired, the last nine would essentially be
wasted, since no greater statistical significance would need
to be achieved. The actual missile test resulted in some
"hits," but more missiles were fired than was necessary to
reject the test hypothesis that the Pk was greater than or
equal to 0.4.
9. T&E, Not Always Treated as a Continuing Process
In order for T&E results to be used to accurately
predict or assess a weapon system's operational effective-
ness, continuous monitoring of the system's development
progress must be maintained. Snapshot looks at the weapon
system at infrequent intervals will not give a valid assess-
ment of a system's potential.
Making accurate assessments of a system's military
worth and operational effectiveness requires considerable
T&E experience on the part of the evaluator. As an illustra-
tion of the need to monitor continually the development
progress of a weapon system, this section will briefly
describe the availability growth that should be tracked in
every development program.
Operational Availability (Ao) is defined as the
ratio of the total time the system is capable of performing
its function (uptime) to the total time when there is a
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demand for the system (uptime plus total down time which
includes maintenance/logistic delay times). Availability
can also be expressed as "the probability that the system
will operate satisfactorily at any point in time when used
under stated conditions" [Ref. 25].
Mathematically operational availability is defined
as follows:
. MTBM
Ao = MTBF + MDT
where: MTBM = mean-time-between-maintenance
(includes corrective and preventative
maintenance
)
MDT = mean-down-time including maintenance
and logistic delay times
Figure 6 is an illustrative time history of a system's
operational availability growth during its development and
initial deployment. Typically , the operational availability
will not be a linear function.
The evaluator needs considerable experience to
accurately interpret such growth time histories. In the
included example the dip in the curve after commencement of
military T&E is typical and is usually caused by the
problems attendant with the new operator developing his
learning curve in operating the system. The learning curve
phenomenon occurs again after the system is introduced to
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Is usually encountered. In this case increased system
familiarity by the fleet results in more critical demands
on system performance and consequently more deficiencies/
failures in the system will be detected. The rapid usage
of the spares reduces the level of spares to the point that
it adversely affects operational availability. This example
illustrates why frequent tracking of operational availability
rather than occasional snapshot looks is required to accurately
evaluate a system's operational availability growth. This
also applies to the tracking of a system's other operational
suitability and performance parameters.
C. GOOD FEATURES OF THE NAVAL AIRCRAFT T&E PROCESS
Although numerous deficiencies exist in the Navy's T&E
process for aircraft weapon systems, many good features
exist:
(1) Navy test pilots and NFO's (Naval Flight Officers)
typically have and maintain excellent operational
backgrounds
(2) Testing is conducted by relatively small organizations
(3) Competition among test agencies stimulates good
performance
(*!) Decentralized test management is practiced
(5) T&E attracts top caliber military personnel.
The Navy's developmental and operational test pilots and
NFO's are required to have recent operational experience
before receiving orders to a T&E project officer's billet.
Pilots and NFO's are selected for admission to the Navy Test
Pilot School on the basis of their operational, academic,
and flight backgrounds. After graduation the engineering
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test pilot or test flight officer is assigned to a project
officer's billet in one of the T&E Divisions at NATC, or
occasionally NMC. Within three years the pilot or NFO is
ordered back to an operational billet. In this way, the
Navy keeps bringing current operational experience into its
DT&E community, and test pilots do not remain in test
billets for extended periods of time, so that they do not
lose their operational perspective. The Air Force operates
considerably different in that many of their test pilots
spend the majority of their flying careers assigned to T&E
billets, and they do not get re-exposure to operational
environments. (The Viet Nam crisis somewhat changed this
in that most Air Force test pilots were given one year tours
of duty in Southeast Asia)
.
Navy aircraft T&E is conducted by relatively small
organizations where the project officer has ready access to
the Commander of the test activity. The so called "can do"
attitude is evident in each of the T&E activities. This
attitude is generally easier to develop in a small organiza-
tion than in a larger bureaucratic organization.
Since many T&E activities have similar capabilities,
competition is generated between these activities in trying
to solicit more project work, obtain greater test capabili-
ties, -etc. This competition assists in causing each activity
to become more cohesive, more work and task oriented, and
better organized. Loyalty and pride in one's test activity
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is prevalent and further facilitates good performance from
a test activity.
The project officer and his team plan and conduct
individual tests. High level T&E management develops and
approves the TEMP and other broad T&E guidelines, but within
these bounds the project officer is given essentially a free
hand in the development of his test plan. This decentralized
management in planning and conducting the tests causes the
personnel conducting the test to be more responsible for the
timely and effective accomplishment of the test objective.
The Navy has made aircraft T&E a challenging, interesting,
and rewarding job assignment. Consequently, the Navy has
been able to constantly attract the highest caliber personnel
for jobs in the DT&E agencies and OPTEVFOR. A tour of duty
in a T&E Agency is regarded throughout the Naval Aviation
community as career enhancing, and this further motivates
good people to seek tours of duty in T&E.
D. A PREDICTION OF THE EVOLUTION OP T&E BASED ON NO
MAJOR CHANGES TO THE CURRENT T&E PROCESS
Unless major changes are made to the Navy's current T&E
process, a gradual and costly evolution will occur, and the
roles of the T&E agencies will be altered significantly. A
basic premise of this thesis is that if the Navy can define
an optimal T&E process, it should make whatever changes are
necessary to achieve this process, rather than relying on a




Previous sections of this thesis describe how the role
of OPTEVFOR has become more encompassing and how this is
causing undesirable duplication among test agencies. This
appears to be the start of the evolutionary process that
is predicted herein.
Since OSD and DD(T&E) place primary credibility on T&E
results obtained from OPTEVFOR, Navy Program Managers may
soon feel compelled to task OPTEVFOR to participate in all
Naval aircraft T&E. If this occurs, when a Program Manager
has a system change that needs military T&E, he will
probably request that only OPTEVFOR conduct the T&E. The
Program Manager could have both a DT&E agency and OPTEVFOR
conduct the T&E, or he might even try to arrange to have
tlJ
a joint OPTEVFOR/DT&E agency team conduct the evaluation.
However, both these alternatives would cost more and take
more time, since two T&E agencies vice one will have to
analyze the data and report their results. So the Program
Manager will make the cost-effective decision and have only
one agency, OPTEVFOR, conduct the evaluation. Since the
DT&E agency works for the developing agency, the Program
Manager should have little trouble in squelching the dissen-
sion that comes from the neglected DT&E agency.
As this process continues the DT&E agencies might be
forced to cut back personnel due to decreased work loads,
while OPTEVFOR increases its size. OPTEVFOR might be forced
to establish its own test pilot school to teach the discipline
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of T&E. Soon OPTEVFOR will have technical capabilities
that make it the only one capable of conducting many types
of T&E.
This evolution would continue until concern arises over
the highly technical T&E that is being conducted by OPTEVFOR.
As a result a suggestion might appear to once again create a
completely separate organization composed of military person-
nel with good operational backgrounds. These personnel would
conduct T&E to determine if a weapon system is suitable for
service use and to develop the optimum employment tactics.
This new type of testing might be called Tactical Test and
Evaluation (TT&E).
An examination of the current T&E environment shows that
such an evolution is well underway:
OPTEVFOR is getting more and more projects.
OPTEVFOR' s Personnel complement is increasing.
More technical expertise is being obtained by OPTEVFOR.
OPTEVFOR is being given more responsibilities while the
DT&E agencies remain fairly stagnant.
The need for an OT&E School is becoming more apparent.





V. PROPOSAL FOR A TEST AND EVALUATION
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
Changes are constantly being made in order to improve
Naval aircraft T&E, but the thought of a major reorganization
of the T&E activities has always been met with a high degree
of apprehension. However, many problems facing Naval air-
craft T&E will not be eliminated unless a major reorganiza-
tion takes place in the T&E community. The less than
optimal utilization of the Navy's T&E resources has been
depicted, and many of the causes have been cited. Since
T&E agencies having similar responsibilities report to
completely separate commands, it is reasonable to assume
that inefficiencies in terms of duplication will be diffi-
cult to reduce. The belief that "more testing is better,
so let's continue to do more and not worry so much about
the duplication" is a simplistic and costly solution to the
Navy's T&E problems, but one that has gained considerable
support
.
A proposed approach to improving the Navy's T&E of air-
craft weapon systems, while achieving an optimal allocation
of the Navy's T&E resources, is the creation of a Naval
Test and Evaluation Command that would have responsibility
for all DT&E and OT&E conducted by the Navy with the excep-
tion of the necessary T&E conducted by Navy Laboratories in
fulfilling their research and development mission. The
Commander of the Naval T&E Command (NTEC) should be a Vice
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-Admiral who also serves as a Director, Major Staff Office
(DMSO) within OPNAV with the title of Director, Naval Test
and Evaluation. Figure 7 shows this proposed OPNAV struc-
ture. It should be noted that the dotted line relationship
between the Chief of Naval Material and the Director, Naval
T&E enables the Naval Material Command to assign DT&E and
OT&E projects to the Naval T&E Command. Projects requiring
Navy T&E from NAVAIR will be managed by the Chief of Naval
Air T&E, and T&E projects from NAVSHIPS (Naval Ships Systems
Command) will be managed by the Chief of Naval Ship T&E.
Those T&E projects coming from the other systems commands
of NAVMAT (Naval Electronic System Command, Naval Ordnance
Systems Command, or Naval Facilities Engineering Command)
or from NAVMAT designated Program Managers will be managed
by either the Chief of Naval Air T&E or the Chief of Naval
Ship T&E depending upon the nature of the project.
The proposed organizational change would put the Direc-
tor, Naval Test and Evaluation (DNT&E) in a newly created
Director, Major Staff Office billet (OP-09A) reporting
directly to OP-09, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations
(VCNO). For compliance with DOD Directive 5000.3, the
Director, Naval T&E, would report the results of his Naval
T&E Command's evaluations directly to CNO, the immediate
superior of the VCNO. As a DMSO directly under OP-09, the
Director, Naval T&E would be able to maintain the necessary
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should be required for the Commander of a T&E organization.
He would never have to function both as the weapon system
sponsor/proponent and as the T&E spokesman to the VCNO, as
is now the case for OP-O98. The data and judgments from
each DMSO reporting to the VCNO would be evaluated as they
are today. However added to the inputs from the other
Major Staff Offices would be the Navy's unfiltered input
from the independent T&E command. This added voice to the
VCNO should facilitate the making of better system
acquisition decisions at the VCNO/CNO level.
The creation of a DMSO for Naval T&E would not separate
T&E from RDT&E. Development test and evaluation must be
an integral part of the iterative research and development
(R&D) process of design-test-evaluate-redesign that con-
tinues until technical uncertainties and development prob-
lems are resolved. This must, therefore, be the responsi-
bility of the development contractor and the developing
agency. The Director, RDT&E (OP-O98) would remain the CNO
focal point for this activity and for all R&D that is occur-
ring within the Navy or under Navy's funding.
However, Navy conducted T&E would be organizationally
separated from this process and would no longer be conducted
by agencies working either for the program sponsor or the
developing agency. This would place Navy conducted T&E
in an ideal location, organizationally, independent from
the developer and fully capable of reporting unbiased test
results to the highest decision making level within the Navy.
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A. DESCRIPTION OP PROPOSED T&E COMMAND
The proposed Naval T&E Command (Fig. 8) would have two
deputies reporting directly to the Director, Naval Test
and Evaluation. One deputy, the Chief of Naval Aircraft
Test and Evaluation would be responsible for all Navy T&E
of aircraft and the associated weapons and ancillary equip-
ment. The other deputy, the Chief of Naval Ship Test and
Evaluation, would be responsible for all surface and sub-
surface ship T&E and the associated weapons and ancillary
equipment. No discussion is contained in this thesis on
the organization or responsibilities of the proposed Chief
of Naval Ship Test and Evaluation. It is recommended that
a separate study be conducted in this area to evaluate the
feasibility of such an organization and to determine a
suitable composition for such an organization.
The staff of the Chief of Naval Aircraft Test and
Evaluation (CNAT&E) would be composed of personnel who would
exclusively monitor and provide guidance for Range coor-
dination, operational T&E by the VX squadrons, education
of project personnel by either the Test Pilot School (TPS)
or the System T&E Training Schools (STETS) to be created
at each Test Center, and the typical staff functions of
every major staff. The Commanders of the test centers
and one test facility would report to the CNAT&E.
1. Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, Maryland
The Naval Air Test Center at Patuxent River would
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(i.e. less the weapon system) and the associated auxiliary
equipments. NATC would also become the air ASW test center,
and would in addition perform T&E on most support aircraft.
NATC would be composed of four test divisions and two train-
ing divisions. No consideration is given in this thesis
to an instrumentation or technical services division which
would probably be required at each major test center. The
Aircraft Test Division would absorb the responsibilities
of the current Flight Test and Service Test Divisions.
Aircraft Test would be responsible for the flying qualities,
performance, and carrier suitability testing of fixed and
rotary wing aircraft (Plight Test's current responsibilities)
and for the developmental T&E of propulsion and aircraft
systems, excluding electrical, armament, and avionics
(Service Test's current responsibilities).
The Naval Air Test Facility at Lakehurst, New Jersey
would retain its responsibility for the T&E of catapults,
arresting gear, and other aircraft launch and recovery
equipments. Having NATF work directly for NATC would more
N
easily facilitate better utilization of the catapult and
arresting gear facilities that are located at both Patuxent
River and Lakehurst.
The Anti-Submarine Warfare Systems Test (ASWST) Division
would replace the current Weapons System Test Division at
NATC. ASWST would be responsible for the developmental
T&E of the electrical armament, and avionics systems in all
rotary wing and fixed wing ASW aircraft and in support
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aircraft, such as AEW (airborne early warning) aircraft and
cargo aircraft. VX-1 would retain its present role of OT&E
of ASW aircraft systems but would also become responsible
for the OT&E of certain support aircraft. VX-1 would main-
tain its operational type organization and its close rela-
tionship with the operational forces.
The U.S. Naval Test Pilot School (TPS) would con-
tinue to report to the Commander, NATC, and its functions
would remain unchanged. Approximately half of its Naval
officer graduates would become project officers in the
expanded Aircraft Test Division, and the remainder would
be assigned to project officer billets primarily at the
systems test divisions at the three test centers. While
TPS would remain a relatively long duration school (one year)
and would provide T&E training to all of the Aircraft Test
Division's project officers and civilian engineers it would
only provide training to a relatively small number of the
project officers and civilian engineers throughout the rest
of the Naval Aircraft T&E Command. Therefore, schools of
relatively short duration, called System Test and Evaluation
Training Schools (STETS), would be established at each test
center to teach the fundamentals of T&E and provide a basic
foundation in the technologies utilized in the necessary
warfare specialities; i.e., ASW, air-to-air, attack, ECM,
etc. (Appendix F presents the basic objectives of these
schools). A STETS would be established at the Naval Air
Test Center to teach the fundamentals of ASW and of any
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required support warfare to the project officers and civilian
engineers/analysts reporting to VX-1 and to the ASW Systems
Test Division. Officers that just graduated from TPS might
require a brief supplementary course from the STETS prior to
commencing work in the systems test division, and those
officers coming back for second tours of duty in T&E might
require a special refresher STETS course.
2. Naval Fighter Test Center, Pt . Mugu, California
The Naval Missile Center Complex at Point Mugu would
become the Naval Fighter Test Center and be responsible for
the T&E of all air to air weapons systems and ancillary and
support equipment. The Naval Fighter Test Center would be
composed of basically four divisions: a Fighter Systems
Test (FST) Division, VX-4, Fighter System T&E Training
School (FSTETS), and PMR (Pacific Missile Range) Division.
FST would be responsible for the developmental T&E
of fighter aircraft weapons, avionics, and electrical
systems, and VX- 1! would be responsible for the OT&E of the
complete fighter aircraft system and/or air to air weapon
system. The Fighter STETS would provide a relatively short
course in T&E of fighter weapon systems to project officers
and engineers/analysts reporting to FST and VX-4. It would
function similar to the STETS at the Naval Air Test Center.
The PMR division would be responsible for the opera-
tion and management of the Pacific Missile Range.
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3. Naval Attack System Test Center, China Lake,
California
The China Lake complex (excluding the Naval Weapons
Center ) would become known as the Naval Attack Systems
Test Center (NASTC). It would be responsible for the T&E
of all attack aircraft weapon systems, and all ECM systems
and reconnaissance systems (excluding ASW) . The center's
responsibilities would include DT&E of the aircraft armament,
avionics and electrical systems of all attack, ECM, and
reconnaissance aircraft, the OT&E of these aircraft, and the
complete Navy T&E of all air to surface weapons. The NASTC
would be organized similar to the NFSTC at Pt . Mugu.
The four basic divisions of the NASTC would be
Attack Systems Test (AST), VX-5, Attack_STETS, and Range
Division. The AST would be responsible for the developmental
T&E of all attack aircraft weapon systems and weapons, and
VX-5 would be responsible for the OT&E of the complete attack
aircraft and/or air to surface weapon. The Attack STETS
would provide the necessary attack, ECM, and reconnaissance
systems T&E training for VX-5 and AST project officers and
engineers/analysts. The Range division would be responsible
for the operation and management of the various China Lake
ranges
.
The Naval Weapons Center (NWC) which is a Navy research
and development laboratory located at China Lake would •
continue to report to the Chief of Naval Research and be the
principal RDT&E Center for air warfare and missile systems.




h. Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility (NWEF)
,
Albuquerque, New Mexico
HWEP would retain its current function of T&E of
nuclear weapons and the associated systems within the
compatible delivery aircraft. NWEF would be subdivided
into a technical division, Nuclear Weapons Systems Test,
and an OT&E division, and a VX squadron. As a result of the
relatively small size of NWEF a formal STETS would not be
established. Instead its project officers and engineers/
analysts would receive T&E training at the Attack STETS at
China Lake and the necessary nuclear technical training
through an informal NWEF training course.
B. DT&E PERSPECTIVE
Discussion of the proposed reorganization with personnel
in the Naval Air Systems Command was usually met with dis-
sension. Their belief that the developing agency requires
absolute control over all DT&E is unfounded. Most aircraft
DT&E is conducted by the contractor, and it is only that
portion of DT&E conducted by the Navy that is in dispute.
Under the concept proposed in this thesis, the developing
agency could task the Naval T&E Command to perform whatever
type T&E is required. The funding for the T&E would be
provided by the developing agency, and the Naval Air T&E
Command would report its T&E results to the developer,
exactly as is done today.
From the developer's perspective little change will
have actually occurred other than the DT&E agencies would
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no longer work directly for the developer. The Program
Manager, the key man in managing the development and produc-
tion of a weapon system, would operate in the NAVMAT Matrix
organization in the same way as he does today. The PM
would still task the various functional NAVAIR Divisions,
other System Command Divisions, and civilian contractors
to perform essential functions for his program. However,
instead of tasking a NAVAIR agency to perform DT&E and
OPTEVFOR to perform OT&E, he would task the Naval T&E
Command to perform all of his Navy T&E.
The developing agency could task the Naval Air T&E
Command to conduct only test and analysis rather than test
and evaluation. This would permit the developing agency
to merely task the T&E Command to obtain specific test data,
but not to evaluate the significance of the data. This
type of request from the developing agency might occur if
the fleet were to lose one or more aircraft for an unexplained
reason (e.g., the wing falling off in flight, but all inci-
dents occurring over water and, therefore, no evidence exists
which would point to the cause). In such a case NAVAIR
would probably task the Naval Air T&E Command to perform
numerous structural tests and analysis and merely send the
various load data to NAVAIR for its evaluation, which would
probably be done jointly with the particular airframe
manufacturer.
At present, much of the development testing is planned
by the Naval Air System Command, and very detailed
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descriptions of the tests and test conditions are given to
the DT&E agencies in the AIRTASKS, the official NAVAIR
document which assigns work and provides funding to the
DT&E agencies under NAVAIR' s control. This same type
procedure should work when NAVAIR tasks the T&E Command to
perform development tests.
With Congressional pressure to decrease the military's
Washington D.C. personnel, NAVAIR is facing severe cutbacks
which could have an adverse effect on maintaining T&E
expertise. The creation of a T&E Command would provide
a simple means which would permit NAVAIR to decentralize
this expertise. Many NAVAIR engineers could be transferred
to the T&E Command which would accomplish two objectives:
(1) It would decrease the number of Navy personnel
in Washington D.C.
(2) It would place the majority of the Navy's aircraft
T&E expertise in the test agency.
In the current system much of the Navy's T&E expertise
exists in NAVAIR, and consequently NAVAIR does much of
the test evaluation, and the test centers do too little
actual test evaluation.
Since the development agency is responsible for develop-
ing a system that works, meets specifications, and is opera-
tionally suitable, the timely and effective conduct of OT&E
is as much a responsibility of the Program Manager as is
the timely and effective conduct of DT&E. Under the proposed
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T&E organizational concept, the development agency would
be able to task the T&E command to perform OT&E in the same
way as it would task the T&E Command to perform DT&E.
At present the Program Manager is essentially the NAVAIR
decision point on where to conduct various tests for pro-
grams that are not tracked by DSARC. It is unlikely that
each Program Office has sufficient T&E expertise to always
make test location decisions which contribute to optimizing
the utilization of the Navy's T&E resources. Program
Manager's T&E decisions on where to conduct various tests
are influenced unduly by the program's dollar and time con-
straints with too little regard for the expertise of the
test agency.
In the current T&E structure, the developing agency's
Program Manager has three alternatives when he requires
that OT&E be performed:
(1) Task a DT&E agency to perform the tests and call
the tests "testing for service suitability" vice
OT&E
(2) Generate a request to CNO to have a Development
Assist 1 project assigned to OPTEVFOR to conduct the
desired OT&E
(3) Request that an operational unit (i.e. an aircraft
squadron, ship, etc.) evaluate the item under
operational conditions.
Development Assists are projects which are assigned




In the proposed T&E organization the Program Manager
would no longer have the flexibility in deciding which
organization should do Navy T&E. The Naval T&E Command would
make that decision and be expected to optimize the utiliza-
tion of the Navy's T&E resources while obtaining credible
T&E results.
One criticism of the proposed change has been the size
of the testing command that would be created and the many
problems that are typical of large organizations. Care must
be exercised to minimize creation of "paper work" stumbling
blocks which are so easy to generate in large organizations.
Prior to the establishment of a T&E Command, a study should
be conducted to determine the best way to organize such a
command while maintaining testing efficiency, especially in
regard to timely completion of assigned T&E including
publishing the reports.
One of the major problems facing Program Managers is
obtaining T&E results within the time constraints specified
in the tasking document (e.g., AIRTASK). As discussed in
Section IV. B. 6, the current T&E organization is frequently
guilty of late completion of T&E reports. A fear voiced by
Program Managers regarding the creation of a T&E command is
the potential problem of its unwillingness to perform T&E
in accordance with the Program Manager's time requirements
with the Program Manager having no capability to order the
T&E agency to perform as directed. Theoretically, this so
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called "ordering" can be done now, but in practice this
requires a dialogue between the Commander, Naval Air
Systems Command and the Commander of the test agency. The
decision as to whether to comply with the Program Manager's
urgent T&E requirement will then consider the overall agency
T&E workload and NAVAIR's overall requirements. In the
proposed structure the Program Manager would hve to resort
to different means to induce this same type of high level
dialogue to determine the relative priority of his project.
However, the central control of T&E should reduce the
problem of determining relative project priorities, since
random inputs from CNO to accomplish "his" special project
would be much less likely, and these projects often cause
arbitrary priorities.
An examination today of the responsiveness of OPTEVFOR
and the timeliness of its completing T&E and publishing
reports should dispel any doubts that an "independent" T&E
agency would respond as rapidly for the developer as a T&E
agency that works for the developer. OPTEVEOR does respond
as rapidly and publishes its reports probably more promptly
than the NAVAIR controlled DT&E agencies.
C. OT&E PERSPECTIVE
One of the big concerns of OPTEVFOR is the need to
maintain a close identity with the operational community.
There is a concern that if OT&E becomes too technical, it
can no longer be truly operational. By adopting the
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proposed T&E organizational change, the VX squadrons would
be better able to maintain their valuable operational
perspective, since they would not be compelled to develop
an imbalance of technical expertise over operational
expertise as appears to be happening today. Since the VX
squadrons are being tasked to conduct some T&E solely on
the basis of their "independence," rather than their
expertise, OPTEVFOR is compelled to become more technically
oriented in order to perform capably the increased technical
T&E requirements. The danger of having this continue to the
point that OPTEVFOR develops an overbalance on the technical
aspects of T&E should be obvious.
The concept of having the VX squadrons operate very much
like an operational squadron in order to maintain a better
operational perspective would be retained. The VX squadrons
would work closely with the co-located systems test division
(ASW, fighter, or attack) throughout an aircraft's develop-
ment. T&E reports from each of the test centers could
contain solely the results of DT&E or OT&E or the reports
could contain the results of combined testing (DT&E and
OT&E). The combined T&E reports would have a technical
section (for DT&E) and an operational section (for OT&E),
and differing opinions in each section could occasionally
be expected. However, the CNAT&E staff would comment on
reports having significantly different findings in the
technical and operational sections in order to aid DD(T&E),
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DSARC, Program Manager, or other appropriate decision
makers in reconciling the different opinions.
In the past the biggest contribution made by the VX
squadrons was in the area of tactics development. This
very important area cannot be overlooked, and the proposed
organization would ensure that tactics development remains
a major function of each VX squadron. By having the VX
squadrons involved earlier in weapon system development they
would be better prepared to develop sound tactics for each
weapon system much sooner than in the past. (Previously
it often took more than a year of fleet operation with a
weapon system before a VX squadron released its report on
optimum use procedures and employment tactics).
When personnel are involved in finding deficiencies and
recommending changes to a weapon system throughout its
development cycle, they very often develop strong feelings
against certain features which they reported as being defi-
cient, and which are often not corrected. It is important
to have the people who are developing tactics for a weapon
system fully believe in and be strong proponents of the
potential of that weapon system. This is a potential prob-
lem area that exists in the current T&E process where the
OT&E project officers are being put more into the role of
developmental testing, in that they perform tests during
the various iterations of design, and the specific defi-
ciencies they cite assist in the evolution of the design.
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This type of involvement has often caused a DT&E project
officer to develop strong dissatisfactions toward the weapon
system he tested.
The proposed T&E organization would not put the OT&E
project officer into this design iteration testing process,
but would allow him to view more readily the development
of the entire system and not each subsystem design iteration.
This will enable the OT&E project officer to maintain a
better operational perspective of the entire system while
becoming involved with the system early enough to develop
tactics on a timely basis.
Perhaps the most overlooked, but often most valuable,
portion of OT&E is the de facto OT&E that is conducted
during the early deployments of a weapon system. As hard
as the Navy tries to move OT&E earlier into the development
cycle, it can never eliminate the value of the actual de-
ployment of the weapon system in the operational environ-
ment. At present the operational command using the system
is often confused as to whom he should report system prob-
lems. NAVAIR is naturally cognizant for aircraft systems
but various T&E agencies often would be able to make a rapid
and valuable contribution if they were informed of the
problem. The user consequently informs NAVAIR but is usually
uncertain as to whether to also contact OPTEVFOR, the appro-
priate VX squadron, NATC, NWC , NMC , or NWEF . The proposed
organization would facilitate better retrieval of operational
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data from the fleet by eliminating the operational command's
dilemma in trying to determine which T&E agency is cognizant
of each problem that arises.
D. T&E ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE WILL CORRECT CURRENT T&E
DEFICIENCIES
Many of the T&E deficiencies cited in Section IV of
this thesis would be corrected by the adoption of the pro-
posed T&E organizational change as follows:
1. Organizational Deficiencies
The creation of a DMSO for Naval T&E would ensure
that proper high level attention is given to independent
T&E results. Since the Director, Naval Test and Evaluation
would not be assigned as a program sponsor, he would not
be forced to change hats between the user and the producer
(advocacy) roles as now occurs in OPNAV with OP-098.
Having the Director, Naval T&E report to OP-09
would preserve the test organization independence that is
required by directive. This independence also appears
logical and makes intuitive sense for a test organization.
In many aircraft companies the Chief Test Pilot reports
to the president as often does the Product Assurance Divi-
sion. The entire T&E command can be thought of as a
Product Assurance is the term now given to many com-
panies' previous Quality Assurance Divisions, since Product
Assurance is meant to be more encompassing. Product assur-
ance includes the disciplines of design assurance, maintain-
ability, reliability, test and evaluation, and safety.
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Product Assurance group that ensures weapon systems meet
specifications and are operationally suitable. Reporting
of such an organization to a high level ensures unfiltered
test results.
Duplication of T&E responsibilities would be more
easily reduced if all Navy T&E is controlled within one
Command. The T&E Command would install among the various
DT&E agencies central line management control, which
doesn't exist today in the NAVAIR T&E coordinator.
Since only one T&E Command would exist in the Navy,
the flexibility of where to assign T&E projects would no
longer rest with the Program Manager, but with the T&E
Command. This_would help ensure that adequate T&E is
-" 6
performed on non-major procurements.
The creation of a T&E Command which is entirely
independent from the developing agencies would eliminate
the dilemma facing DD(T&E) today. He would be able to place
equal credibility on all test results from the T&E Command,
and would not have to request an operational test agency
to repeat a technical test merely to ensure that the re-
quired degree of independence is maintained in the test
results
.
Placing all T&E agencies under one command would
facilitate the creation of a uniform system of funding
throughout the testing community. It would also simplify
the task of identifying all the funding required for T&E.
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With all the test agencies under one command, all
ranges would also be controlled by the same command. This
central control of ranges would facilitate easier identifi-




Much of the overlap between OT&E and DT&E within
the Navy has been caused by the need for independence being
identified with only OT&E. By having all T&E independent
of the developing agency the different perspectives of the
OT&E and DT&E roles can be more easily retained.
Having T&E Command visibility at the VCNO level
would ensure that test planning is given more attention
and T&E experts become involved in this planning. This
high level visibility should ensure the creation of better
operational test objectives.
The problem of inadequate technical expertise in
the OT&E test agency, OPTEVPOR, would be somewhat reduced
as a result of the elimination of the need for the OT&E
agency to expand its testing expertise into more developmen-
tal type testing. The creating of STETS (System T&E Train-
ing Schools) at each test center would provide a place to
give all project officers and civilian engineers/analysts
a basic background in T&E, and should therefore improve
the entire OT&E and DT&E process.
Late test results is a problem that would not be
corrected by the proposed organization alone. Since each
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test center would be organized similarly, each test center
would be motivated to develop the most efficient T&E
report review process. However, this area should be given
considerable attention when creating the Naval T&E Command.
With a T&E Command that is independent from the
developer and that is capable of ensuring specification
compliance, there would no longer be a need for BIS. It
is, therefore, recommended that BIS be disestablished if
this thesis proposal is adopted.
By having the VX squadrons within the T&E Command,
the need for analysts throughout the T&E Command would become
obvious. As the need for more analysts within the T&E
community is recognized a better career pattern for analysts
within Navy T&E should evolve. This would increase the
ability of Navy T&E to attract and retain high caliber
analysts.
By having one T&E Command it will be easier to
ensure continual monitoring of development programs. The
infrequent snap shot looks at a program by each of the Navy
agencies which often occurs today was shown to be an unsat-
isfactory method for assessing system potential. The pro-
cedure of assigning a resident T&E team composed of both
DT&E and OT&E personnel during a systems' early development
Is being utilized by the Air Force on the B-l program
[Ref. 27] and was utilized on the F-15 program. This
procedure has considerable merit and will be relatively
104

easy to implement if all Navy T&E personnel were assigned
to one Naval T&E Command.
The creation of a Naval T&E Command will give
increased stature to all T&E within the Navy. This should
make T&E duty for Naval Officers more highly desirable for
second and third tours of duty than it is today. Effective
military T&E can only be planned and accomplished by per-
sonnel who have operational and technical backgrounds and
testing experience. Too little emphasis in the past has
been placed upon encouraging good officers to become
specialized in the T&E field and to develop that necessary
testing experience. As a result, many middle and top mana-
gers within the T&E agencies are not of the caliber necessary
to manage the type of effective and efficient T&E that the
Navy's limited resources demand. The creation of a Naval





VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. The valuable internal "user-producer dialogue" is
lost during the latter stages of a weapon system's develop-
ment, since the Navy's independent T&E organization, OPTEVFOR,
reports to OP-O98 who is compelled to act as a system propo-
nent and must often conceal weapon system development
problems.
2. Neither the development T&E agencies nor OPTEVFOR
is independent from the influence of the developing agency.
3. An excessive amount of duplication exists in the
testing conducted by the major participants in the Navy
aircraft weapon system T&E process.
k. Inadequate central management exists among the NAVAIR
T&E activities, consequently costly duplication of facilities
and expertise exists among the NAVAIR T&E activities.
5. OPTEVFOR is being tasked to perform T&E often on the
basis of its independence rather than on its testing
capability.
6. Adequate checks do not exist in the Navy's acquisi-
tion process for non-major systems to ensure that adequate
T&E is conducted and that the major deficiencies are
corrected prior to procuring and deploying the system.
7. The costs for conducting T&E cannot be totally
identified, and numerous methods are utilized by the T&E
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agencies to calculate the costs of their performing T&E.
This lack of standard cost accounting makes T&E cost-
effectiveness decisions nearly impossible to perform.
8. Central aircraft T&E range management does not
exist, consequently it is a difficult task to justify the
various ranges and make rational decisions when forced to
reduce range assets.
9. A clear distinction between the responsibilities
of DT&E and OT&E does not exist, consequently testing
duplication is increasing.
10. Test agencies do not participate adequately in
early T&E planning.
11. . Adequate criteria against which OT&E can be
conducted often does not exist.
12. Inadequate technical expertise exists in OPTEVFOR
to effectively perform all of its responsibilities. This
problem has been magnified by the increased T&E responsibil-
ity given to OPTEVFOR.
13. A definite requirement exists for a technical course
of instruction in the discipline of Weapon System T&E.
14. Program Managers frequently do not receive test
results from the various test agencies soon enough to assist
in making vital program decisions.
15. OPNAVINST 3960.8 shows BIS commencing along with
OPEVAL prior to the DSARC III major production decision.




16. A shortage of statistical analysts exists throughout
the T&E community (DT&E and OT&E).
17. Test and evaluation is often treated as a process
where snapshot looks at a system can give valid conclusions
as to the system's development progress. This is false, and
T&E must be treated as a continuing process..
18. Many good characteristics continue to exist in the
Navy's T&E process.
a) Navy test pilots and NFO's typically have and
maintain excellent operational backgrounds
b) Testing is conducted by relatively small
organizations
c) Competition among test agencies stimulates good
performance
d) Decentralized test management is practiced
e) T&E attracts top caliber military personnel
B . RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The Navy should create a Naval T&E Command that
would have responsibility for all Navy conducted T&E and
OT&E with the exception of the necessary T&E conducted by
Navy laboratories in fulfilling their R&D missions.
2. The Commander of the Naval T&E Command should also
serve as a Director, Major Staff Office reporting to OP-09,
the VCNO. .
3. The Naval Air T&E Command should be organized as
proposed in this thesis.
k. A study should be conducted to determine the
appropriate organizational structure and functions of a
Naval Ship T&E Command.
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5. A System T&E Training School should be established




ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH INTERVIEWS WERE CONDUCTED
1. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C,
DDR&E (T&E)
2. Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D.C.
ASN (R&D)









NAVAIR T&E Coordinator, Patuxent River, Md.
5. Senate Armed Services Committee
RDT&E Subcommittee
6. Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, Md.
7. Sub Board of Inspection and Survey, Patuxent River, Md.
8. Operational Test and Evaluation Force
Headquarters, Norfolk, Va.
Air Development Squadrons One, Four and Five




DEFINITIONS OF DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E)
DT&E is that T&E conducted under the sponsorship of the
developing agency to facilitate in the evolution of the
system. Its specific functions are to:
"(1) demonstrate that the engineering design and development
process is complete.
(2) demonstrate that the design risks have been minimized.
(3) demonstrate that the system will meet specifications.
(4) estimate the system's military utility when introduced."
[Ref . 6 ]
The types of tests included in DT&E are: engineering
tests, contractor/laboratory demonstrations, Navy Technical
Evaluations (NTE), Navy Preliminary Evaluations (NPE), and
deficiency correction tests. Advanced development, engineer-
ing and production prototype models are used for DT&E.
Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E)
"OT&E is that test and evaluation conducted to estimate
the prospective system's military utility, operational
effectiveness, and operational suitability (including
compatibility, interoperability, reliability, maintain-
ability, and logistic and training requirements), and
need for any modifications. In addition, OT&E provides
information on organization, personnel requirements,
doctrine, and tactics . . . OT&E will be accomplished
by operational and support personnel of the type and
qualifications of those expected to use and maintain
the system when deployed, and will be conducted in as




OT&E is divided into two categories, initial operational
test and evaluation (IOT&E) and follow-on operational test
and evaluation (FOT&E). IOT&E is that OT&E conducted prior
to the first major production decision (DSARC III). FOT&E
is the continuing OT&E of a weapon system after the produc-




INSTRUCTIONS/DIRECTIVES PERTAINING TO THE T&E OF NAVAL
AIRCRAFT WEAPON SYSTEMS
DOD Directive 5000.1, "Acquisition of Major Defense Systems",
13 July 1971
DOD Directive 5000.3, "Test and Evaluation", 19 July 1973
SECNAV Instruction 5000.1, "System Acquisition in the
Department of the Navy", 13 March 1972
OPNAV Instruction 3930. 8B "Assignment and Prosecution of
Test and Evaluation Projects", 5 April 1973
OPNAV Instruction 3960.8 "Test and Evaluation of Navy
Systems and Equipments", 22 January 1973
OPNAV Instruction 5*120.70, "Mission, Organization and
Function of the Board of Inspection and Survey",
2 April 1971
OPNAV Instruction 5440. ^7D, "Mission and Functions of
Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR)",
6 March 1973
NAVAIR Instruction 5^00. 27B, "Assignment of Coordination
Responsibilities for the Naval Air Systems
Command's Test and Evaluation Functions",
20 December 1972
INSURV Instruction 13100. 1A, "Aircraft Acceptance Trials;




NAVAL AIRCRAFT WEAPON SYSTEM T&E ORGANIZATIONS
Naval Air Systems Command
Naval Aerospace Recovery Facility, El Centro, Calif.
Develop, test, and evaluate parachutes and related
systems for human escape methods and systems, and
retardation and recovery systems.
Naval Air Engineering Center, Philadelphia, Pa.
RDT&E in launching, recovery, and landing aids for
aircraft and in ground support equipment for aircraft
and airborne weapons systems.
Naval Air Propulsion Test Center, Trenton, N.J.
Test and evaluate aircraft propulsion systems — their
components, accessories, fuels, and lubricants.
Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, Md.
Test and evaluation of aircraft weapons systems,
their components and related equipment.
Naval Missile Center, Pt . Mugu, Calif.
Test, evaluation and development support of Naval
weapons, weapons systems and related devices.
Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility, Alburquerque , N.M.
Test and evaluation and technical support for nuclear
and designated non nuclear weapons and weapon systems.
Operational Test and Evaluation Force
VX-1 (Air Test and Evaluation Squadron One), Patuxent River, Md.
OT&E of airborne anti-submarine weapon systems, support
systems, components, and equipment.
VX-4, Point Mugu, Calif.
OT&E of all-weather fighter weapons systems and air-
launched guided missiles weapon systems.
VX-5, China Lake, Calif.
OT&E of airborne attack weapon systems and support systems.
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Chief of Naval Research
Naval Air Development Center, Warminster, Pa.
Principal Navy Research, Development, T&E center for
Naval Aircraft systems.
Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, California





NAVY RANGES AND FACILITIES USED
FOR AIRCRAFT WEAPON SYSTEM T&E
Ranges
:
Atlantic Fleet Weapons Range, Roosevelt Roads, Puerto
Rico "
Atlantic Undersea T&E Center (AUTEC), West Palm Beach,
Fla.
Pacific Missile Range (PMR), Pt . Mugu, Ca.
Naval Weapons Center (NWC) Ranges, China Lake, Ca.
Naval Weapons Laboratory (NWL) Ranges, Dahlgren, Va
.
s
Facilities with their associated test cites:
Naval Aerospace Recovery Facility, El Centro, Ca.
Naval Air Propulsion Test Center, Trenton, N.J.
Naval Air Test Center (NATC), Patuxent River, Md.
Naval Air Test Facility (NATF), Lakehurst, N.J.
Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Facility, Indian
Head, Md.
Naval Ordnance Missile Test Facility, White Sands,
N.M.





SYSTEM TEST AND EVALUATION TRAINING SCHOOLS (STETS)
The main purpose of the STETS would be to teach the
basic fundamentals of T&E to project officers and civilian
engineers/analysts who are engaged in aircraft weapon system
T&E. Specifically, each major test center would have a
STETS which would provide courses of study for all project
officers and civilian engineers/analysts who are being
assigned to T&E jobs. Each test center's STETS would con-
centrate on teaching the fundamentals of the particular
warfare specialties of that test center (e.g. STETS China
Lake would concentrate in the areas of aircraft attack
systems, air to ground weapons, electronic countermeasures,
and reconnaissance).
In addition to teaching the technical and statistical
aspects of T&E, STETS would also conduct classes dealing
with the following: the test center's range/s utilization
procedures and capabilities, the Navy's organization for
weapon system acquisition and the role that the test center
fulfills, the test center's funding system and the proce-
dures that must be followed to enable it to function,
technical services (instrumentation, photo coverage,
computer time, etc.) that are available to the test team




The STETS full course of study would take approximately
eight to ten weeks with half day attendance. The half day
attendance would enable the pilots and NFO's to spend the
other halves of these days in familiarizing themselves with
the aircraft/new systems they would eventually be testing,
in further developing their flying proficiency, and in
commencing an orderly project takeover from the project
officer they would be replacing. The civilian engineers/
analysts would spend the other halves of these days working
in their respective divisions by providing assistance to
the experienced engineers in data reduction or in some other
tasks which they could fulfill.
Besides the STETS full course of study, abbreviated
courses should be offered. These abbreviated curriculums
would serve as refresher courses for officers who are
reassigned to T&E billets and have already graduated from
the full STETS course. The abbreviated curriculum could
also be used to give TPS graduates that are being assigned
to non-aircraft division billets a better foundation in
Weapon System testing.
The following is a typical course content which could
be utilized by the STETS.
1. Mathematics/Mechanics refresher - introductory
course including analytical geometry, calculus, statics,
and dynamics. Its main purpose would be to ensure all




2. Statistics - a course to give the student sufficient
depth of understanding in probability and statistics that
he would be able to appreciate the statistical implications
of test design and test results. Course would present some
simple statistical test designs and illustrate the increased
test effectiveness and potential cost savings that are
possible when tests are designed knowledgeably
.
3. Computer Technology - an introductory course where
digital and analog systems are studied. Fundamentals would
be studied and student would be taught how to utilize
various computer systems available at the test center. The
integration of computers into complex weapon systems would
be studied as would methods of differentiating computer
software problems from system hardware problems in complex
weapon system testing.
4. Fundamentals in Warfare Specialty (more than one of
these might be offered at each STETS) - course would teach
the basic fundamentals of the particular warfare specialty.
General areas to be studied include: test techniques, sys-
tem integration problems, state of the art limitations,
new technological advances and their potential applications,
etc
.
5. Data acquisiton - course would study different types
of instrumentation and photo equipment systems. Capabili-
ties, limitations, and relative expenses of each would be
studied. Each student would learn how to read different
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types of instrumentation and become familiar with the
typical errors that may result.
6. Weapon System Acquisition Process - this course
would present a general overview of the entire acquisition
process highlighting how the particular test center fits
into the process. Requirements determination, DSARC pro-
cess, DOD PPBS process, DOD agency roles and responsibili-
ties, DOD budget cycle, program manager's role, etc. would
be studied.
7. Range Operation - operation and capabilities of the
test center's ranges would be studied as would the capabil-
ities available at other Navy and DOD ranges. The particu-
lar operating procedures for the test center's ranges would
be studied.
8. Test Center Support - the myriad of support facili-
ties at the test center would be studied as would the pro-
cedures required to obtain these services. These include
instrumentation, photo coverage, computer services, aircraft
maintenance, etc.
9. Project Funding - the operation of the test center's
budget system would be studied as would the procedures
required to obtain funding for a particular project. The
test center's budget system reporting requirements would
be taught.
10. Report Writing - this course would teach technical







1. Acquisition of Major Defense Systems
, Department of
Defense Directive 5000.1, 13 July 1971.
2. Acquisition of Major Systems
,
Report of the Commission
on Government Procurement, Vol. 2, Part C, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington D.C., December 1972.
3. Kline, M.B. and Lifson, M.W., Systems Engineering,
Lecture Notes
, Engineering and Physical Sciences
Extension, U.C.L.A., April 1970.
4
.
Staff Report on Operational Test and Evaluation
,
Report
to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the
Department of Defense, by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel,
Appendix F, July 1970.
5. Government Accounting Office (OSD Case No. 3389),




6. Test and Evaluation
,
Department of Defense Directive
5000.3, 19 January 1973-
7. Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate Report
(To accompany H.R. 8687), Report No. 92-359, 7 September
1971.
8. Public Law 92-156, Section 506.
9. Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate




Systems Acquisition in the Department of the Navy
,
Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000.1, 13 March 1972.
11. Test and Evaluation of Navy Systems and Equipments
,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction
3960.8, 22 January 1973.
12. Mission and Functions of Operational Test and Evaluation
Force (OPTEVFOR) , Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Instruction 5440. 47D, 6 March 1973.
121

13. Young, H.L., Test and Evaluation of the F-14 Aircraft
Weapon System; A Managerial Analysis
, M.S. Thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California,
September 1973.
14. Veda Corporation Report VA 578U/4.509, Final Report
on OT&E Study For Aircraft Systems , 10 August 1973.
15. Department of the Navy RDT&E Management Guide , NAVSO
P-2457 (Rev 7-72), 1 July 1972.
16. Dienst, W.L., A Plan For Optimum Use of Military
Personnel In Aerospace System Testing , Student Research
Report No. 47, Industrial College of the Armed Forces,
Washington D.C., 1967.
17. Aircraft Service Acceptance Trials; Procedures for
,
Board of Inspection and Survey Instruction 13100.1A,
1 October 1972.
18. Naval Air Test Center, Aircraft Weapons Systems Test
and Evaluation Ad Hoc Committee Report
,
14 June 1967.
19. Assignment of Coordination Responsibilities for Naval
Air Systems Command's Test and Evaluation Functions
,
Naval Air Systems Command Instruction 5400. 27B, 20
December 1972.
20. Naval Air Test Center, Report No. ST-87R-72, Test and
Evaluation of HLU-196 A/E Powered Bomb Hoist Tn
Conjunction With the Single Hoist Ordnance Loading
System (SHOLS)
, by N.D. Gieske and R.V. O'Dell, 20
June 1972.
21. Benjamin, Joe D., "No Pain, No Strain", Naval Aviation
News
, pp. 8-15, April 1973-
22. Deatrick, E.P., "DOD Test and Evaluation", The Society
of Experimental Test Pilots 1972 Report to the Aerospace
Profession, Vol, II, No. 2, p. 215-218.
23. Department of the Navy Programming Manual
, 5 June 1971.
24. Project Instructions Volume II , Commander Operational
Test and Evaluation Force Instruction 3930. IF, November
.1970.
25. Kline, M.B., Concepts of System Effectiveness , Notes
prepared for the U.C.L.A. Short Course, Cost-Effective-




26. Assignment and Prosecution of Test and Evaluation
Projects
,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Instruction 3930. 8B, 5 April 1973.
27. Sturmthal, Emil, "B-l Operational Test and Evaluation
'An Early Look'", The Society of Experimental Test
Pilots 1973 Report to the Aerospace Profession , Vol.
11, No. 4, p. 57-61.
B. OTHER REFERENCES (NOT CITED IN THESIS):
Fleming, R.J., What Constitutes Independent Testing
,
Student Research Report No. 112, Industrial College of
the Armed Forces, Washington D.C., 3 March 1971.
Naval Air Test Center Ad Hoc Committee Report, Aircraft




Naval Air Test Center, Study of Test and Evaluation
Process
, Conducted for NATC Long Range Planning Group,
1973.
Rand Corporation RM-5238-PR, An Adaptive Method of
Test Selection In System Development , by N.H. Hakanson,
April 1967.
Rand Corporation R-333 5 Military Research and Develop-
ment Policies , by B.H. Klein, W.H. Meckling, Mesthene,
E.G. , 4 December 1958.
Rand Corporation P-3107, Testing, Analysis, and
Decision Making , by F.A. Tatum, April 1965.
Tuomela, C.H., Naval Aircraft Weapon System Testing
,
April 1973.
U.S. Naval Air Development Center, Long Range Resource
Committee Summary Report , Volume I, 15 February 1972.
General Accounting Office Report B-163058, The
Importance of Testing and Evaluation in the Acquisition





1. Defense Documentation Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0212 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 939^0
3. Professor M.B. Kline, Code 55Kx 2




4. Asst. Professor F.R. Richards, Code 55Rh 1




5. LCDR William C. Bowes, USN 2
TPS, NATC
Patuxent River, Maryland 20670
6. Cbariman, Code 55 1




7. LCDR Robert Porter, USN 2
COM0PTEVF0R
Norfolk, Virginia 23511
8. Capt. J.J. Tyson, USN, OP-983 1
Office of the CNO
Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20360
9. Capt. K.L. Melin, USN 1
Senior Member Sub BIS
Patuxent River, Maryland 20670
10. Prof. W.M. Woods 2





SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE ftfh.n Data Entered)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONSBEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Submit)
A Proposed Reorganization of Test and
Evaluation for Naval Aircraft Weapon
Systems
5. TYPE OF REPORT S PERIOD COVERED
Master's Thesis;
March 197^
6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHORfj;
William Charles Bowes
8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERft)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 939^0
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS





13. NUMBER OF PAGES
126
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME 4 ADORESSf// different from Controlling Olllce)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 939^0
15. SECURITY CLASS, (ol thla report)
Unclassified
tSa. DECLASSIFI CATION/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION ST ATEMEN T (ol thla Report)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol the abstract anlerad In Block 20. 11 different from Report)
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverae aide If necaaaary and Identify by block number)
Test and Evaluation
Aircraft Weapon System
Operational Test and Evaluation
Development Test and Evaluation
20. ABSTRACT fConllnue on revarea aide It neceaaary and Identify by block number;
This thesis evaluates the Navy's test and evaluation (T&E)
process for aircraft weapon systems, identifies problems, and
proposes a reorganization of the Navy's T&E agencies. Many
changes have been made to improve the T&E process, but some of
these have resulted in costly inefficiencies. Contributing
problems include: the Navy's "independent" test agency being
tasked more on the basis of its apparent independence than on
DD FOHM
''<•' I JAN 73
(Page 1)
1473 EDITION OF I NOV «5 IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-014- 6601 |
125
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Bntered)

CtCUHlTY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS P«GEfWi«n D«(« Enl.r.J)
(20. ABSTRACT continued)
its testing expertise, lack of actual independence of the many
test agencies, excessive testing duplication, inadequate
test planning, lack of a weapon system T&E school, and numerous
T&E management problems.
The establishment of a Naval T&E Command which is organiza-
tionally separate from the developing agency and the OPNAV
program sponsor is proposed. The Naval T&E Command would be
responsible for all T&E conducted by the Navy with the exception
of that done by Navy Laboratories. The Naval T&E Command would
have separate divisions responsible for development T&E and
operational T&E, and the developing agency could task the T&E
Command to perform any type of T&E.
DD Form 1473 (BACK)
. 1 Jan 73













zation of test and eval
uation for Naval air-
craft weapons systems
















zation of test and eval
uation for Naval air-
craft weapons systems.
lhesB753
A proposed reorganization of test and ev
3 2768 002 07376 9
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
